The Strategic Threats Israel Faces - And a Path Forward - Part Two
February 17, 2023 - Issue #43
I had planned to begin Part Two of this article with a dry summary of the ten threats Israel faces that I wrote about in detail in Part One, contained in my last newsletter. Viewed as a whole, they present a grim picture but not a hopeless one. My writing plan was to then present a path forward, not for advocating with certainty what Israel should do, but more to illustrate the interconnection of the choices Israel must make. Yesterday, I did some final edits, but something was bothering me. Something was missing. This morning, I realized what it was.
There is now a reluctance by many, including Israel’s most fervent supporters, to remind themselves of the terrible events of October 7 by reliving them. I get it. The images and descriptions of that day are horrifying. But our collective failure to relive those moments separates us from the nightmare that Israelis continue to live through. Sure, we remember and acknowledge the depravity. But for us—whose direct family members were not raped, kidnapped, murdered, and mutilated—the pain softens as our memories are tempered by the ongoing march of both related and unrelated events.
But we cannot let happen. Not if we want insight into what Israel must do to combat the existential threats it now faces. Not if we want to understand the “why”, in addition to “what” Israel must do to survive. Not if we want to maintain our vigor to fight on behalf of Israel, the Jewish people, and all those of whatever faith or nationality that are victims of pre-planned, unprovoked intentional terror for religious or political purpose.
I was reminded of the need to relive the pain this morning while reading an article in the Washington Post, titled "Video is Said to Show U.N. Relief Worker Taking Israeli Shot on Oct. 7.” The video shows two terrorists from Gaza, one a U.N. Relief Worker, drive up to the body of a dead Israeli man, callously dumping him into the back of their vehicle, nonchalantly poking through his personal effects on the ground, and then driving off. That two-minute video encapsulates what Israel is fighting against and why it must not accept any half measures that will permit its enemies to strike again. So does #Nova, the documentary film now circulating which I will see next week, that brings to light the terrors inflicted on those that attended that festival.
Who does these things? How can anyone think those perpetrators, or their allies, will act rationally and honestly in subsequent negotiations? How can anyone accept living near those who would act with such depravity again and again and again?
Israel’s war is for its survival. The Washington Post video and article reminded me that our task is to remain resolute in support of Israel’s need to eradicate that which threatens it. Israel’s war is one of bullets and rockets. Our war is one of words and images. If we refuse to relive October 7 on a regular basis while Israel is still fighting its battles for existence, then we risk taking the bait that Israel’s enemies cast among us. That bait, like that which fish feed on before they are hooked, is the ruse of humanitarianism. The ruse that Israel is acting wrongfully when it is Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, and others that are the culprits. If Hamas surrenders, not one more Gazan civilian will die. If Hezbollah honors U.N. Resolution 1701 by retreating from Southern Lebanon, no further fighting in Lebanon would be necessary. If Iran stopped supporting terrorists worldwide and reversed course regarding building nuclear weapons, the world would be a much more peaceful place. And if the Palestinians genuinely wanted peace, much of the conflict in the Middle East would be over.
But it will not happen. Not because of Israel, but because all these malevolent actors are hell bent on destroying Israel and for most, installing some form of Islamic caliphate that would sweep through the region. And also, sadly, because of those who have been taken in by their propaganda or are ingrained with Jew hatred.
So, what should Israel do in the face of the interrelated threats facing it? The following ideas I present comprise one collective solution. I lack the hubris (well, maybe if I am honest) to suggest it is the only one. Rather, I offer them as a platform for understanding how complicated the task is. And that solving one problem without considering the next, as so many pundits happily advocate, is not a prescription for success but a recipe for disaster.
So, here goes.
Israel does not possess the capability to eliminate the main source of the immediate existential threat it faces—Iran. But Israel still has the time and ability to defang Iran by resolutely eliminating the powerful local threats Iran has fashioned. By doing so, Israel would have the opportunity to pivot to the other concerns I listed in Part One of this article contained in my last newsletter.
Step one is mandatory— eviscerating Hamas. That requires taking control of Hamas’ last redoubt—Rafah. Rafah is likely where Hamas’ leadership is hiding. Rafah is where many Israeli hostages are. Rafah is where Hamas’ remaining armed strength is holed up. Rafah is Hamas’ link to the outside world from which it can bring in more armaments through Egypt’s porous cordon. Anything short of taking Rafah would allow Hamas to rapidly reconstitute—rendering meaningless all that has been accomplished by the IDF and making certain another future round of conflict that would then inflict even more suffering on Gazan civilians.
Step two is pushing Hezbollah back from the border far more than the five miles now being contemplated by the diplomatic community. This is a prerequisite for peace given that since October 7, Hezbollah has fired up to 5,000 projectiles at northern Israel, many in swarms of ten or more. Meanwhile, its forces have embarked on multiple attempts to infiltrate into Israel. All this, and Hezbollah’s capacity to do far more, have caused 80,000 Israelis to leave their homes near the border and brought economic activity in the region to a halt. Resolution 1701, promulgated by the United Nations as a guarantee to Israel in return for ending the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah (started when Hezbollah attacked an IDF patrol on a road inside Israel—killing several soldiers and abducting two that died in captivity—failed to live up to its promise. Rather than resulting in a demilitarized southern Lebanon enforced by UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, the resolution has covered for Hezbollah’s vast increase in military capability abutting the border, estimated to include missiles or other armaments in one out of every three homes dotting the region.
Unfortunately, the solution most advocate for is one that will not work—a diplomatic one. The formula presently being parlayed is for Hezbollah’s most well-trained terrorists—its Radwan force—to pull back five miles from the border and to replace them with a strong Lebanese army force. In return, it is proposed that Israel should negotiate (fold?) on thirteen border disputes regarding land. Without getting into the details, this means:
Israel should make land concessions in the face of a war initiated by Hezbollah in solidarity with Hamas.
Israel should for some reason trust that the Radwan forces will never make the ten-minute journey back to the frontlines from their new bases five miles from the border.
Israel should accept that Hezbollah will keep its tens of thousands of missiles hidden in homes within walking distance of the border.
Israel should believe that Hezbollah will give up its armed control of the 200 Shiite villages in southern Lebanon where many Hezbollah terrorists live, and not hide forces within them charged with entering Israel and inflicting on Israeli citizens there what Hamas did on October 7.
Israel should believe that the Lebanese Armed Forces will enforce demilitarization of the region when half its soldiers are Shiite of which many are Hezbollah members or sympathizers, and all are supposedly beholden to a government that Hezbollah controls or strongly influences.
Nevertheless, absent some increase in the number of daily missiles fired at Israel or the lethality of Hezbollah’s attacks, I believe for legitimacy purposes, (I am not naive enough to think that has much benefit) Israel should give diplomacy a chance to get it right even though it will almost certainly get it wrong. However, Israel must not make any land concessions as part of a deal, nor should it accept any resolution that leaves Hezbollah with the ability to fire anti-tank or other short-range missiles into Israel. Failing to do that will encourage Hezbollah to engage in future violence. And Israel must issue a deadline and a bottom line. The deadline should be no more than ten days out. That creates needed urgency. The bottom line is that there must be a believable enforcement mechanism that contains far more than a promise of Lebanese army action should Hezbollah ignore the requirements placed on it or should it try to filter its forces back into the demilitarized area.
Call me doubtful at best that a diplomatic answer can be reached. Should it not be, Israel has no choice other than to immediately embark on a military solution. Kicking the can down the road guarantees a bigger problem later; Hezbollah’s strengthening, the international community further hamstringing the IDF, and a return of Lebanese civilians to their homes in southern Lebanon making any ensuing war more lethal for them. For a military solution to work, Israel must move quickly with overwhelming force in the north to push Hezbollah back and root out its missiles while many of its citizens are insulated somewhat from the dangers of war while they remain evacuated and the soldiers are there. Immediate needs could be accomplished in days if there is the will to do so. Rooting out the missiles would take longer, but very likely nowhere near what we have seen in Gaza. This haste is necessary because the longer a campaign against Hezbollah takes, the more damage Israel will sustain from Hezbollah’s rockets, the more opportunity for the world to intervene, and for the United States to exert withering pressure before Israel achieves it goals.
Meanwhile, should the IDF move into Lebanon, Israel must simultaneously hasten resolution of its battle with Hamas consistent with the use of minimum necessary force, consideration of sound tactics and IDF soldiers’ lives, and its own view of the obligations of international law—but without regard to obligations superimposed by outside forces that have their own agenda. The recent provisional ruling by the ICJ and its refusal to amend it in the face of an imminent Rafah operation, has opened that window more than it was. Israel must use this opportunity to finish the job in Gaza sooner rather than later.
Then, with the threat from Hamas ended and Hezbollah’s reduced, Israel could turn to resolving its significant, longer-term concerns—dealing with Iran’s nuclear threat and finding a path forward, to resolve its issues with Palestinians. But until Hamas is one and Hezbollah weakened, Israel cannot afford to risk a solution in the West Bank because an activated 205-mile West Bank border would bring yet another terrorist entity to the fore, this time near Israel’s urban core. That would cause an untenable problem should Israel simultaneously have to face an uncowed Hezbollah and a resurgent Hamas bent on revenge. Israel should privately make this clear to the United States, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. So should all of us to those willing to listen. We also must make clear, that Israel has no choice but to destroy Hamas and weaken Hezbollah with or without anyone else’s support because not doing so is a recipe for Israel’s long-term dissolution. That is why it is so important for all of us to forcefully remind ourselves of the horrors of October 7. For us to be maximally effective in our advocacy, those memories must remain visceral not cerebral.
Then, with the fight over in the north and south, Israel with its borders secured, might consider privately offering to the U.S., the Saudis, and the UAE an expansive view of potential Palestinian autonomy that over the long-term could lead to statehood if certain conditions are met, but making clear that a pre-requisite for Israel’s flexibility on that issue is their agreement to join with Israel to deal with Iran as is necessary—something that is in the interest of all parties. Thus, tying Palestinian issues to weakening Iran’s capacity for mayhem. If successful, Iran’s proxies in Yemen and Iraq and Syria will weaken as Iran does. So weak, they may well fall from the vine without much extra effort.
Simultaneously, in return for Saudi and UAE investment and administrative involvement in Gaza, Israel might agree to permit Palestinian Authority involvement in Gaza in a ceremonial role (a major concession) if the IDF has the unlimited right to enter Gaza to deal with specified security issues. Simultaneously, Israel could then agree to immediately turn to a two-state inquiry (notice my purposeful refusal to use the term two-state solution which wrongly connotates the answer before determining if there is Palestinian will) for finding a just path for Palestinians on the West Bank along the lines Israel had previously divulged privately while also holding out that carrot in Gaza for when calm prevails and the educational system there is changed This stage would best be done in the open so that any Palestinian perfidy is revealed to the world. Once that process is ongoing, Saudi Arabia would then agree to recognize Israel per prior a private commitment to do so.
And then, finally, Israel would be able to fight the worldwide information battle against anti-Semitism and Israel hatred from a position of strength. The Palestinian issue will either be history, or the Palestinians will be revealed for what they may well be—a people that will never say “yes.” Iran will be neutered, and the region on a path to economic prosperity and cooperation.
In 1967, Israel similarly faced mobilized Arab armies on multiple fronts and an embargo on its shipping from Eilat. This forced Israel to mobilize its army, causing the nation to bear significant emotional and economic strain that it could not sustain for long. Moreover, its main warplane supplier, France, made clear that if Israel attacked the encircling forces that vocally and physically threatened the nation’s destruction, France would not honor an already struck deal to sell to Israel fifty more planes. Nevertheless, seeing no other solution and not having the ability to stay mobilized for the long-term, Israel took advantage of its interior lines to strike first and eliminate the threat Egypt presented, then Jordan, then Syria.
Six days later Israel lived in a new world, one that provided it much more security than in its first nineteen years.
Similarly, Israel today has interior lines. It can choose which of its enemies to deal with first. And like dealing with an Octopus, it can cut off each of Iran’s arms until only a helpless head is left. What Israel cannot do is rely on half measures that leave all its enemies with the initiative and with all the strategic threats it faces outstanding.
I do not pretend that my suggested path is the only one. But unless the threat from Hamas and Hezbollah is first eliminated it is hard to see how Israel can find a way forward that does not involve an unacceptable existential risk. But for Israel to maximize its chances for a successful outcome, it must choose its path quickly before it becomes entangled by external politics, military logistical deficits, and national exhaustion.
Can Israel succeed? My answer is encapsulated in the words of my friend, Sarit Zehavi who said, “If we don’t have a choice, we are capable of anything.”
And it is incumbent on us to pave the way forward by explaining why the hard road is the necessary road for Israel’s survival. That includes not permitting ourselves to unconsciously due to our human nature that abhors images of violence, and to quite understandably, slip into the category of Israel’s eleventh strategic threat by not keeping October 7 front and center in our minds.
IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 16, 2024—From the Institute for the Study of War
5 Myths About Israel and the War in Gaza (Episode #351)—A Powerful Podcast from Sam Harris—January 30, 2024
Why Israel Is Winning in Gaza—Written by Edward N. Luttwak for Tablet—February 8, 2024. This detailed article lays out details not usually included in news reports that explains Israel’s success. Luttwak is a pre-eminent military historian and strategic writer.
![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F68e19cb4-044b-433e-b222-eaebc203e16b_1300x867.jpeg)
Sorry, but There Is No Two-State Solution—Written by Gadi Taub for Tablet—February 12, 2024.
Netanyahu: IDF Readying Rafah Invasion, ‘Victory is Within Reach’—Written by Joshua Marks for Jewish News Syndicate—January 27, 2024. I think this is an important read for understanding Netanyahu’s true position regarding Rafah and Egypt’s and the United States.
![Trucks delivering humanitarian aid enter Gaza at Egypt's Rafah crossing, Nov. 25, 2023. Source: IDF Screenshot Trucks delivering humanitarian aid enter Gaza at Egypt's Rafah crossing, Nov. 25, 2023. Source: IDF Screenshot](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97e1ae05-67fb-4d5e-9419-2cdaaa2ff8d5_1320x880.jpeg)
Israel Looks to Assuage Egyptian Concerns over Philadelphia Corridor—Written by Yaakov Lappin for Jewish News Syndicate—January 31, 2024—Also an important read as Israel prepares to go into Rafah.
The Inevitable War Between Israel And Hezbollah – Analysis—Written by Hussain Abdul-Hussain for Eurasia Review News & Analysis—February 10, 2024
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Israel Could Request a Global Alliance to Finish Destroying Hamas's Gaza Tunnels - Exclusive—Written by Yonah Jeremy Bob for the Jerusalem Post—February 8, 2024
![Kids at UNRWA summer camps pointing fake guns at child with Israeli flag on helmet Kids at UNRWA summer camps pointing fake guns at child with Israeli flag on helmet](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff70ad544-45b5-4186-90c1-a71a1113a8f8_1024x756.jpeg)
The UN Relief and Works Agency Provides Summer Camps for Children of More Than 5 million Descendants of Arab Evacuees of the 1948 War—Written by David Bedein for Israel Behind the News—February 2, 2024. I literally stumbled on this web site and found a wealth of shocking information about UNWRA. I suggest you peruse the information found there and come to your own conclusions about the nefarious role UNWRA has played over the last seven decades.
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border