There is No Substitute for Victory
August 20, 2025 - Issue #83
Per an unnamed Israeli general, we need to recognize that “Gaza is the most complex problem that the IDF has faced since its inception in 1948.” There, the IDF now faces off against an entrenched guerilla force in an urban warfare environment consisting of a myriad of tunnels and densely packed multi-story buildings. It is an environment further complicated by the fact that Hamas does not care one bit about the civilian population other than how to best use them as a tool for its physical and ideological survival.
So, what should Israel do in Gaza now? For weeks pundits, ex-generals, journalists and politicians have been voicing their opinions—in print, podcasts, talk shows, and the like. Many are people I respect, some I know. Most recommend that Israel pursue one of three basic policy options. They are:
Ending the war without ending Hamas’ control of Gaza in return for a full hostage release. Of course, this presupposes a deal in which Hamas would agree to release all the hostages if the IDF fully retreats from Gaza, allows unrestricted humanitarian aid, and American guarantees that Israel will not resume the war later.
“The squeeze approach” articulated by Bret Stephens and others. This plan does not first require making a deal with Hamas. Instead, its advocates suggest that Israel:
Pull back from most of Gaza other than from specified corridors, especially the Philadelphi corridor, thus allowing Israel to restrict arms and other specified materials coming across Gaza’s border with Egypt and preventing Hamas’ unfettered movement in Gaza,
Maintain a wide security zone extending more than a mile into Gaza,
Flood Gaza with humanitarian aid,
Target Hamas with special forces raids,
Not allow any reconstruction in Gaza until all the hostages are released and Hamas agrees to disarm (and perhaps its present leaders leave Gaza).
In addition, at least one proponent also suggested that for Israel to claim a strategic victory, Israel should redefine a successful war outcome as being “destruction of Hamas as a military entity but not its total eradication.”
Taking the fight to Hamas, thereby ending the war by taking control of the two main remaining Hamas strongholds—Gaza city first followed by the al-Mawasi and central camps region (the Netanyahu plan that the security cabinet approved).
Proponents of policy approach #1 prize the lives of the remaining hostages over the certainty of eliminating Hamas but forecast that Hamas will do something in the future that would give Israel justifiable reasons to go back into Gaza to finish off Hamas.
Proponents of options #2 and #3 share the goal of eliminating Hamas and securing release of the hostages but differ about the best method and how to deal with both domestic and international opposition.
In order of prioritizing ending Hamas’ survival as a military and potential governing entity:
Option #1 offers only a hope of future action to foreclose that possibility.
Option #2 offers a plan for furthering pressure on Hamas to give up but has no certainty of succeeding due to Hamas’ resiliency and intransigence. Further, it does not foreclose a change of American administration heart that might result in future American pressure on Israel to agree to a future unsatisfactory deal with Hamas. Also, due to the delays inherent in the plan, which is primarily defensive, option #2 likely would take too long to succeed even if eventually successful, resulting in the death of some of the hostages and the certain further suffering of any survivors due to the abysmal conditions Hamas forces them to endure. Furthermore, I doubt that it would result in any lessening of international condemnation of Israel.
Option #3 is the most certain way to end Hamas’ military and governance capability soon (depending how fast the IDF operates). However, it comes with battle risk that includes heightened IDF casualties, an uncertain probability that some or all live hostages will be killed by Hamas during the fighting and at least short-term increased international outrage and retribution.
As such, none of the three options are good. Israel’s government, therefore, had to choose which one is least bad considering both short-term and long-term considerations.
Additional Factors to Consider
If the war ends with Hamas able to govern Gaza, Hamas will try again to kill or capture Israelis, thus provoking another war. So will other Jihadi organizations and Iran who will see hostage taking as the surest way to make Israel and the Western world grovel.
Hamas is a despotic Jihadi regime. If it maintains control in Gaza it will educate, recruit, and train Gazan youth to hate Israel while also imposing its tyrannical control on the Gazan people. As such, there will be no hope of deradicalization but a certainty of further radicalization.
Hamas will not release its grip on Gaza due to any pressure other than possibly the imminent threat of its demise. Nor will Hamas ever give up its dream of destroying Israel.
Israel’s army is rundown but still effective.
Israel’s domestic divisions, manipulated by Hamas and fertilized by war fatigue, are growing.
Israel’s Knesset, not in session now, reconvenes on October 19, 2025. Until then, absent extraordinary political maneuvering, Prime Minister Netanyahu will not face a potential no confidence vote that could topple his government, perhaps giving him an opportunity to further separate his policies from the most far-right portions of his coalition.
The longer the war goes on, in any form, the worse Israel’s international position will get and the more likely the current American administration will move away from its presently supportive policies.
Instituting Netanyahu’s plan will likely lead to an immediate worsening of Israel’s international position.
Israel’s standing in the world has little chance of changing positively before the war ends. The same is the case for the opinions of most democrats in the United States.
Unless there are significant changes on the ground (immediate IDF victory coupled with Arab national involvement in Gaza governance or a complete Israeli retreat), there is little likelihood of changing the international march towards recognizing a Palestinian state.
The most likely time frame for nations declaring their support for Palestinian statehood will begin on September 23, 2025, when the United Nations General Assembly begins its high-level debate. However, there is no common understanding what Palestinian statehood entails.
International recognition of a Palestinian State, especially by just the U.N. General Assembly, is relatively meaningless in effect for at least the short-term but will have a negative impact on future negotiations with Hamas should Hamas remain a force in Gaza. Meanwhile, just the declaration of intent by many nations to recognize a Palestinian state has empowered and encouraged Hamas to be even more intransigent and lengthened the time the hostages have suffered (It is my fervent opinion that the failure of so many states and individuals to unequivocally condemn Hamas, combined with unfair and often manipulated criticism of Israel, has caused more hostage suffering not less, more Gazan deaths not less, and caused the war to last as long as it has).
Unless Hamas changes its hostage starvation policy and improves the dismal living conditions the hostages endure, many, if not all remaining hostages will not survive much longer.
If the IDF attacks Gaza City or al-Mawasi and the central camps, Hamas may kill many, if not all, of the remaining living hostages.
Hamas needs to retain some live hostages for negotiation purposes and protection. Thus, a partial hostage deal could be a tortured death sentence for those that would remain in the tunnel dungeons and even if Israel attacks Hamas might keep some hostages alive for last minute negotiation purposes.
If the IDF attacks Gaza City and then in al-Mawasi and the central camps, many more IDF soldiers will die but the number will be less than if the IDF delays its attack or attacks at a later date after fully withdrawing from Gaza.
Gazans are suffering. Whether they will suffer more by being forced to move from Gaza City and then the al-Mawasi and the central camps than if left to remain where they are is a matter of fair debate.
Unless Hamas is disarmed and removed from ruling Gaza, no nation will participate in reconstruction in Gaza—leaving Gazans in perpetual misery.
The IDF’s Chief of Staff vigorously opposed early constructs of the taking the fight to the enemy plan which was to attack everywhere at once to more aggressively go after Hamas but it is not clear how opposed he is to Netanyahu’s present plan which is much closer to what the Chief of Staff advocated. Also, the Chief of Staff does not have to deal directly with the international pressure now cascading onto Israel nor political and economic considerations outside of the purview of the army. As such, his opinion is important but not conclusive.
Even a temporary military occupation of Gaza will be costly. But so will it be costly, although likely to a lesser degree, to maintain a partially mobilized IDF if the IDF does not now remove Hamas from Gaza.
The Choices
Ending The War with Hamas in Power and the IDF leaving Gaza
I will not spend much time on this awful option because readers of this newsletter are aware of my disdain for this approach even though it could lead to the release of some or all remaining live hostages. For new readers, I laid out in detail the negative impact of Hamas remaining in power in my July 29, 2025, newsletter, titled Food Distress In Gaza—Truth and Blame.
However, I do want to point out that proponents of this option argue that obtaining a release of the hostages:
Demonstrates Israel’s commitment to its citizens.
Prevents the loss of more soldiers.
Mitigates army fatigue.
Reduces the financial burden of the war.
Will improve Israel’s image abroad.
Will not prevent Israel from using a future pretext to go back into Gaza to eliminate Hamas.
They also hope that then some form of Palestinian or other international and Arab government could be installed in Gaza which would condition reconstruction on Hamas abstaining from future military action.
Yet, Hamas may well not release all hostages, will demand U.S. guarantees, and may not have all the hostages in its possession-especially those that are deceased. And should Israel withdraw from Gaza, Hamas would both declare victory and be perceived by many Jihadists and sympathizers as having been victorious, thereby providing motivation for more terrorist operations in the future. This will also provide impetus for domestic upheaval in the many Arab nations whose governments are now trying to position themselves closer to the western world.
Meanwhile, I do not believe the world will be so ready to jump on board with an Israel perceived as a loser. Nations, like people, adore winners. Israel, reviled and seen as a loser, would not be given a clean slate by the international community. Instead, Israel would be seen as being unable to stand up when pressed and therefore would be pressured to do more that would jeopardize its security. Likewise, far from reducing worldwide antisemitism, backing down now might well incentivize it—little different than the consequences of failing to stand up to playground bullies.
Furthermore, it is “pie in the sky” to believe that Israel would in the future preemptively invade Gaza in the face of war fatigue of the Israeli people, a guaranteed virulent international reaction and potential lack of support from America. Thus, Hamas would rearm, enforce a stranglehold on the Gazan people, and again launch some form of terror attack on Israel resulting in further civilian death and suffering (Israeli and Gazan) and the death of more IDF soldiers.
Thus, the end the war option will not end the war, it only guarantees that it will continue.
The Squeeze Option
Proponents of this option well understand that Israel cannot permit Hamas to remain in power. However, they think that by pulling the IDF back while flooding Gaza with humanitarian aid that Israel will be able to pressure Hamas to negotiate its demise, better ensure American support, and return the hostages. This is poppycock. For this plan to succeed all the following must happen (followed by my analysis as to why it might not):
Hamas must surrender before the remaining hostages die. Given the pictures Hamas released of skeletal 21-year-old Israeli hostages Rom Braslavski and Evyatar David, 24, I doubt the ability of the remaining hostages to endure longer than Hamas’ capability to resist.
The international community must accept Israel using the suffering of Gazan citizens to pressure Hamas because the “squeeze” plan contemplates no improvement in Gazan living conditions—only the presence of plenty of food, water, and medicine. But this running sore of Gazan suffering will put more American and international pressure on Israel, not less.
Targeted attacks contemplated by the “squeeze” plan must not kill disproportionate numbers of Gazan citizenry. However, Hamas will do everything in its power to create the reverse result. This is how it has operated to date. And, with the IDF no longer on the ground, Hamas would continue to maximize and publicize (often falsely and without disclosing its own complicity) Gazan deaths and suffering but perhaps with even more effectiveness. Furthermore, as in any war, mistakes will happen, each one of which will become the subject of international outrage and aggrandizement.
The “squeeze” plan would give the IDF a meaningful rest. But the IDF will still have to use significant numbers of troops to blockade the Gaza strip and launch strikes within it. Furthermore, unless Hamas surrenders relatively quickly, the “Day After” if the squeeze plan does not work is either an invasion of Gaza that would be more costly in soldiers’ lives than today because Hamas will have further entrenched in all of the Gaza Strip or alternatively a more mobilized IDF defensively necessary for making sure that Hamas does not regain its strength and attack into Israel again.
Those few in Gaza that oppose Hamas will continue to do so or survive the withdrawal of the IDF. But this will not happen. They will be marginalized by the general populace’s fear of Hamas and murdered by a vengeful Hamas. Therefore, those that worked for the GHF and those that opposed Hamas in small and large ways, will be no more. Good luck finding others to do so.
Hamas must feel pressured by the squeeze plan. However, given the likelihood of Israel being increasingly pressured by the international community, the cost and difficulty of an endless partial mobilization, recognition within Israel that the hostages’ days are numbered, the massive amount of food and other supplies that Hamas will commandeer, and the general Jihadi philosophy that promotes martyrdom over survival—I suspect it is Israel that would break first as more and more hostages die due to the miserable conditions Hamas is subjecting them to.
Promoters of the “squeeze” policy think that would more ensure American support for Israel over the long run, but I think not. The United States, and the West in general, does better with short wars. We favor resolutions over unending resilience. An Israel that partially pulls back will face constant pressure from the United States to pull back further. Bipartisan support in America, already severely fractured, will disappear in the face of enduring Gazan suffering. And then, more likely than not, those who have not yet formed their opinions will lean against Israel.
The “squeeze” plan assumes that nothing new will happen to shake the region and the calculus. But this is a preposterous gamble because always something new happens, especially when the time frame is many months or years. Sentiment in the United States could change for the worse. A terrible weather event could deepen Gazan suffering. Hamas could decide to kill hostages one-by-one until it gets what it wants. An earthquake in Israel along one of its major fault lines could roil Israel’s staying power. International ad hoc political maneuvering, embargos, and the like (already seeing France revoking visas for El Al workers) could further damage Israel. Antisemitic terror attacks could mount around the world that jeopardize Jews and their supporters everywhere. In short, the world Israel operates in will not remain static and any changes will likely more hurt Israel than help it.
Thus, the “squeeze” plan is predicated on a shaky set of assumptions and a continued belief that Hamas can be brought to reason. I disagree. And further, should the squeeze plan fail (I think it inevitable)—when more live hostages are dead, when Israel’s political standing is worse and domestic discontent greater—I think it unlikely that Israel will be able to then expeditiously mount an invasion throughout Gaza to achieve what it could now do comparatively quickly in the 25% of Gaza still under Hamas’ sway.
The bottom line is that the “squeeze” plan gives up Israel’s initiative in return for little or no tangible gain. It contemplates a defensive posture bolstered by lashing out when and if there is something to be gained by doing so. Meanwhile, Hamas will sit tight while further stirring international vitriol and Gazans will continue to suffer.
Taking the Fight to Hamas
Prime Minister Netanyahu introduced his plan at two news conferences—one in English and one in Hebrew. During those conferences, he enunciated five principles for concluding the war in Gaza (I have added some verbiage for clarity):
Hamas must disarm.
All hostages must be freed.
Gaza must be demilitarized.
Israel must have security control of Gaza that overrides any outside civilian administration of Gaza.
A peaceful non-Israeli civilian civil administration must be installed in Gaza in which there would be no paying for terrorism and no educational system that creates new terrorists. Therefore, no Hamas and no PA which has failed to meet those goals in the West Bank.
At present, the IDF holds about seventy-five percent of the Gaza Strip. The war cabinet debated two options for taking action to end the far now. The first would have been a simultaneous push into the remaining twenty-five percent. But that would have trapped more than a million Gazans—possibly causing the death of thousands of civilians although it likely would have ended the war faster.
Instead, Netanyahu chose a different path and obtained agreement for it. First, Israel will evacuate the roughly million or more civilians in Gaza City to the south and establish a much more robust process for feeding and housing them (included in this on a time scale that is not clear, is increasing the number of GHF aid locations from 4 to 16 and possibly changing the format to allow for at least some appointments to pick up food to alleviate pandemonium). For those that doubt Israel’s ability to do this, remember Rafah in early 2024. After Netanyahu dithered in the face of international pressure for two months, Israel successfully removed about 1.4 million civilians from harm’s way in about a week before swiftly taking control of the city.
Once the civilians are out of Gaza City, the IDF will conquer this important Hamas redoubt where Hamas houses much of its remaining governmental functions and where most of its senior leadership and strongest surviving military units hide. Once accomplished, Israel would then control about eighty-five percent of the Strip. Israel expects this will take about six to eight weeks.
The hope is that this push alone might break Hamas’s grip—potentially forcing Hamas to agree to a deal for all remaining hostages coupled with Hamas’ surrender and the withdrawal from Gaza of any of its remaining senior commanders. If not, the next step would mirror what will be done in Gaza: this time evacuating civilians from the central zones to Rafah and then taking Hamas’ final stronghold. This second step would also take about six to eight weeks according to what I have read.
Then, the IDF will engage in a transitional military control of the Gaza Strip until another non-PA and non-Israeli civil administration implements a system that could include many locally run independent areas overseen by an umbrella administrative entity. No Israeli settlement of Gaza will be permitted despite the ranting of some far-right elements. Alternatively, others suggest a more rapid IDF withdrawal supplemented by the kind of operations contemplated in Option #2 above, but I do not see that as realistic given the havoc that might create within Gaza.
The advantages of launching an offensive to end the war are many:
Israel will regain the initiative, always crucial in war.
Because Israel will remain ready to make a deal with Hamas that fulfills Israel’s objectives, there will be a greater opportunity to secure the release of live hostages sooner rather than later when they are dead (already in the face of Israeli determination we are seeing announcements that Hamas bent ever so slightly by agreeing to some form of a still unacceptable partial deal that they had not agreed to before).
Jihadi Islam will have suffered another defeat, empowering more moderate forces in the Muslim world.
Once the operational phase is over, the process of reconstruction of Gaza can begin and Gazan suffering will diminish.
Once the operational phase is over, with the implementation of a civil authority composed of outside powers, increasing numbers of IDF reserves can be released to go home and the drain on IDF equipment will largely end. Furthermore, recent estimates are that mobilization of 130,000 reservists will be required to finish the war—a far cry from the 300,000 that mobilized immediately after October 7.
Nothing will enhance Israel’s near-term information war prospects than the conclusion of fighting, victory on the ground, and then rapid implementation of an appropriate post war administration of Gaza.
There will not be an otherwise certain future war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Thus, in the long term, less Israeli soldiers will die and less Gazan citizens will die and suffer.
Israel’s and the West’s enemies will have learned that hostage taking is not beneficial for achieving goals.
Israel’s domestic tribulations will focus more on the issue of who the next leader will be coupled with an exhaustive examination of pre-October 7 mistakes, than on whether Israel should jeopardize its future by favoring an uncertain course for obtaining hostage releases versus defeating an implacable foe with existential designs on the Jewish State.
But of course, there are disadvantages too to Netanyahu’s plan:
The hostages will face more immediate risks because all could be killed in retribution by Hamas or inadvertently by the IDF’s attack.
More Gazans might die in the short-term.
More IDF soldiers will die in the short-term.
International condemnation of Israel will mount as will the number of measures that will hurt Israel economically, politically, and even militarily.
Worldwide, antisemitic acts might increase.
My Take
I see no choice but to proceed aggressively to defeat Hamas now because time is not on Israel’s side. Nor is time on the hostages’ side or on the side of Gazan citizens. However, time is certainly on Hamas’ side. For the longer the status quo continues the more international and domestic pressure on Israel will mount. Therefore, as long as Hamas is free of existential pressure it will choose delay over capitulation. Thus, Israel must now push hard to topple Hamas. Only then is there any chance of a negotiated solution that includes Hamas’ surrender. And only then, if Hamas continues to refuse to make a deal, will the war end with the near-term fall of Hamas and a hopeful release of some or all of the remaining live hostages along with the rapid introduction of at least a vision of a better life for the Gazan people.
And for those that lament the present state of Israel’s army and question the will of the Israeli people, I am reminded of what General Elazar said when he refused to countenance an IDF retreat in the 1973 war when the Syrian army threatened to overrun Israeli forces on the Golan Heights and pour into the Galilee, “When it rains on you the enemy is getting wet too.” He was right. Israel’s forces then turned back the similarly hard pressed Syrians and marched into Syria. Now, Hamas is getting wet while it is hunted incessantly and living in tunnels. I refuse to believe that Hamas has more resilience than the IDF. Now, we are at the edge of victory. Healing from the wounds of the war can come later. One more push is all that is necessary and any step back might never be regained.
Now it is past time to finish the job.
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The UN's Gaza Deception Exposed—Written by Yaakov Lappin for The Lappin Assessment
The Truth about Humanitarian Aid - from Entry to Distribution—Written by LTC Nodav Shoshani for Mission Brief—August 18, 2025
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Global Food Insecurity Scale Was Eased in Order to Declare ‘Famine’ in Gaza—Flash Brief from The Foundation for Defense of Democracies
The New Syrian Army- Senior Officials with Jihadist Background—Written by Boaz Shapira for the Alma Research and Education Center—August 6, 2025
The New Syrian Army—Written by Boaz Shapira for the Alma Research and Education Center—July 31, 2025
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Hamas and the Armed Resistance After October 7—Where To?—Written by Yohanan Tzoreff ofr the Institute for National Security Studies—August 7, 2025
An Israeli Military Official Details Expansive Israeli Humanitarian Operation in Gaza—Written by Felicia Friedson/THE MEDIA LINE for the Jerusalem Post—July 31, 2025
The Tragic Truth Behind Israel’s War Strategy—Written by Joshua Hoffman for Futre of Jewish—July 31, 2025
What Are Israel’s Choices in Gaza? The Insanity of Double Standards and Uninformed Analysis.—Written by John Spencer for John Spencer Urban Warfare—August 1, 2025
“Finishing the Job” in Gaza: What It Means and What It Takes—Written by John Spencer for John Spencer Urban Warfare—July 26, 2025
Andrew Fox 4 Part Examination of the Future of the Middle East:
"This three(actually four)-part series of long articles, spanning over 14,000 words of detailed analysis, examines how Israel’s adversaries are adjusting after military setbacks; how disinformation and international backlash threaten Israel’s global reputation; and what Israel, the US, and Gulf allies must do next to achieve lasting peace. From Hamas’s guerrilla tactics to Iran’s diplomatic maneuvers, the reputational risks of the Gaza war, and the fragile promise of the Abraham Accords, this is my most comprehensive account yet of what is truly at stake. It merges military insight, diplomatic foresight, and narrative strategy into a clear roadmap for the region’s future.”
Part One—First of four articles.
Part Two—The Abraham Accords, escalation risks, and Israel’s reputational crisis.
Part Three—Solving the issue of Palestine once and for all.
Part Four—A regional strategic roadmap to counter adversaries and secure lasting stability.
How Yossi Cohen Set Stage for Hezbollah Beepers, Iran Tech Surprises, Assassinations - Exclusive—Written by Yonah Jeremy Rob for the Jerusalem Post—July 3, 2025
Inside the harrowing attack on Syria’s Druze — and why the US’ first step in the right direction is vital—Written by Hussain Abdul-Hussain for The New York Post/The Foundation for Defense of Democracies—July 27, 2025
Born Dead: The New York Declaration for Two States—Written by Hussain Abdul-Hussain for The Times of Israel—August 3, 2025
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
Robert - thank you for your comment. I fully agree it is very long but I decided when I started this newsletter to err on the side of being comprehensive rather than short and sweet so to speak. But I fully realize many don't have the time or inclination to read the long articles. And I fully respect that.
Really good analysis. Now you need to convince the IDF to move because you are right that time is not in Israel’s side.