DOES HEZBOLLAH PRESENT AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO ISRAEL?
Yesterday, somebody fired thirty-four or more missiles into the Western Galilee from southern Lebanon. This is a huge escalation from the status quo. In addition, three mortar shells fired from near Lebanon’s border with Israel landed in open areas near Metula. Probably Hamas launched the missiles. But certainly, Hezbollah approved the attacks. However, even more concerning than the number of missiles launched is the number intercepted by Iron Dome—only twenty-five. Five more landed on Israeli territory, at least two of which plowed into civilian areas.
That is evidence of a huge problem. It means that Iron Dome only intercepted somewhere between eighty-three and ninety-three percent of the missiles destined to hit civilian targets (it is not clear if all five missiles untouched by Iron Dome landed in civilian areas). The implications of that are astounding.
In an all-out war with Israel, Hezbollah will fire 4,000 missiles at Israel on the first day and 2,000 or more on succeeding days. If Israel only knocks down eighty-three to ninety three percent, that will leave hundreds of missiles that will strike property, people, or military targets. Some of those missiles will carry between half-a-ton and a ton of explosives, enough to destroy much of a city block. A few, up to a thousand, are precision guided, meaning they have a fifty percent chance of landing within a couple hundred feet of their targets. The payloads of Hezbollah’s other missiles are enough to damage or destroy a building or vehicle and kill unprotected people nearby. If fired at a heavily populated area, they are likely to hit something precious. In addition, Hezbollah possesses up to 2,000 UAVs (drones). Individually many can only do localized damage. But in a swarm, they can take out chemical plants or fuel storage facilities. And just imagine driving on roads with hunter UAVs overhead! Meanwhile there is little doubt that Hezbollah’s Radwan force will attempt to snatch border communities where they will kill or kidnap their residents, thereby demoralizing the nation and providing a huge propaganda boost to Israel’s enemies.
Israel’s defenses depend on high-tech weapon systems married with ground forces. But ground forces in sufficient numbers to destroy Hezbollah’s missiles inside Lebanon will take days to reach the border regions. Along the way, evacuating civilians and missile strikes on the few highway interchanges will impede their progress. And Hezbollah’s growing cyber capability might interfere with the IDF’s defenses too.
Why is this potentially existential? Let’s first be clear on our definitions.
The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel published a memorandum in 2020 titled Existential Threat Scenarios to the State of Israel. In it, the editors defined an existential threat to Israel as:
“One that endangers the very existence, sovereignty, and agreed-upon identity of the state. This threat relates to three main levels: at the physical level, the harm to the State of Israel would be critical, from which it is impossible to recover and return to normal functioning; at the level of sovereignty, the state would lose control of its institutions, its population, and its resources; and at the level of identity, the state would experience the loss of its character as a Jewish and democratic entity that enables Israel to serve as the nation-state of the Jewish people.”
Is the table set for Hezbollah to threaten Israel’s vibrancy and therefore its existence?
Unfortunately, yes! If Hezbollah’s missiles, joined by Hamas and Iran’s other proxies, successfully strike key strategic and infrastructure targets numbering in the tens, not the hundreds, Israel’s economy would be devastated, and thousands of Israeli citizens would be killed or wounded. The country is the size of New Jersey, and like New Jersey, it has about 9.5 million citizens living in it exclusive of the West Bank. Within the crowded center of the nation, more than three hundred buildings rise twelve stories or more, and at least twenty-nine soar 500 feet and at least forty stories high. One or more hits on any of those buildings would cause mass casualties and panic.
Furthermore, the country has only two international airports, but the one in the center, Ben Gurion Airport, is the entry point for most people visiting the country. As for ports, the main one is in Haifa. A few other smaller ones dot the coastline. Also, industry is much focused in Haifa, alarmingly close to the northern border, and north-south transportation mainly relies on two highways with interchanges. Most banking, finance, and Israel’s burgeoning IT industry are also concentrated in the middle of the county. In other words, Israel’s lifeblood is in its crowded center. It would not take many well-placed hits there to destroy Israel’s infrastructure and ability to thrive.
And then there is the matter of population protection. If Israel engages in a war with Hezbollah, because there are not enough defensive missiles and batteries to go around, Iron Dome operators will first focus on protecting military assets, industry, and transportation networks. People will have the least priority. Especially the smaller communities in the north and south of the country. Yesterday, a friend of mine faced a dilemma that would be replicated everywhere in a general war. She lives in northern Israel and had thirty guests to her home for Passover. But when the missiles began to fly over her home, she only had one safe room that was two square meters. Perhaps enough for five to crowd into for a short period of time. Nowhere near enough for multiple guests undergoing a long-term bombardment, or even a small family sheltering in place for days.
Then, when the war ends, rehabilitation will be delayed because many necessary systems and infrastructure nodes will have been damaged or destroyed. Some would require months to repair and huge budgetary outlays. For weeks or months electricity and food might become hard to come by. As would the ability for the populace to earn an income and industry to produce necessary goods. That could cause citizens to leave the country and/or lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them.
So, what to do in the short run?
Israel has no choice but to reestablish deterrence. Thirty-four missiles fired at Israel from Lebanon is an attack by Hezbollah, no matter who it chooses to blame or hid behind. Hezbollah runs southern Lebanon. Hamas has built an administrative center in Lebanon to coordinate its actions with Hezbollah and is subservient to its much more powerful partners, including Iran. Those missiles didn’t fly off the launchers without Hezbollah’s okay.
How can Israel re-establish deterrence? By launching a massive airstrike on Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ weapon depots in Lebanon plus a partial mobilization of ground troops. The retaliatory strikes that occurred overnight were pinpricks. Will that be enough to deter Hezbollah from future ventures? That is unknown, but I doubt it despite any warnings that may have been secretly passed on. And, I admit, even if a massive strike is carefully calibrated to minimize loss of innocent lives in Lebanon, mistakes will be made that Hezbollah will use to its advantage. But if Israel does not act fearlessly and forcefully it faces the certainty of one day having to endure an existential strike launched as part of Hezbollah’s strategy or because of an accidental confrontation caused by Hezbollah continually upping the ante.
And to all of you receiving this bi-monthly newsletter for the first time, please write to me about what you think could be improved. And, of course, unsubscribe if you would rather not get this. But, if you think it worthwhile, please forward this newsletter to anybody who you think would be interested in reading it.
Massive Rocket Barrage Fired from Lebanon into Israel on Passover—April 7, 2023—Written by Yonah Jeremy Bob, for the Jerusalem Post. On April 6, 2023, thirty-four or more rockets rained down on the western Galilee. For good measure, three mortar shells hit ground near Metula.
Full Backing for Government Despite its Damage to national Security—April 6, 2023—written by Eliav Breur for the Jerusalem Post. Despite prior differences, Gantz and Lapid close circles with Netanyahu after the missiles hit Israel.
A Tale of Two Lebanons: Stuck Between Hezbollah and a Republic—April 3, 2023—Written by Adnon Nasser for the National Interest. This is based on a fascinating interview with one of the leaders of the opposition to Hezbollah inside Lebanon.
Israel Must Consider Hezbollah’s Response to an Iran Strike—March 29, 2023—Written By Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Schuel Tzucher for the Jewish News Syndicate. This opinion piece echoes many of my conclusions about preemption and preventative war in my book Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah: A War Without End.
Ghosts of Beirut: Hunt for Hezbollah Leader Imad Mughniyeh Turned into Spy Thriller—April 6, 2023—Written by Maan Jalaal for Arts and Culture. Wow! I can’t wait. On May 19, 2023, Showtime will drop this 4-part thriller. The producers of Fauda are behind this production. Readers of my book: Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah: A War Without End, will likely share my excitement.
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge. Sales have been brisk, surpassing my expectations.
And, I am excited to report, one major newspaper has assigned a review of the book to a reporter. Fingers crossed!
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border