Israel's Painful Deal With Hamas For Release of Some Hostages
January 18, 2024 - Issue #70
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The Hostage Deal
I apologize in advance. This will be a dense read. But I will not give short shrift to the results of the hostage negotiations. I think it important to learn details and concerns because the complexity of the agreement coupled with its ambiguity makes it more likely to unravel. And even if the agreement holds, knowing the severe price Israel has paid will necessarily shape your opinions and improve your ability to advocate for Israel going forward because you will be better prepared to foresee the dangers that lie ahead directly attributable to what Israel is now prepared to do to get some of its people back today with the hope of getting back more later.
By now, most or all of you have heard there is a deal on the table for the release of about a third of the hostages still in Gaza with the possibility of more after further negotiation. In fact, by the time you read this, it is possible that a few hostages will have already been released. Some of you might also have heard that a January 16 Israel security cabinet meeting to approve the deal was put off until today, January 17. This happened because Hamas, at the last minute, sought changes to the terms of the deal as it also tried to do without success a couple days before. Netanyahu steadfastly refused the most recent demands which involved Hamas wanting Israel to release several especially nefarious terrorists earlier, if ever, than called for in the negotiations. Suspicious of Netanyahu, some thought that the problem was more about Israeli domestic politics than new terms. However, in response to Hamas, Netanyahu issued a statement saying that the delay was caused by Hamas reneging on “an explicit clause that gives Israel veto power” over which terrorists with blood on their hands will be released as part of that deal and that instead, Hamas demanded to “dictate the identity of these terrorists.” Hamas, which is not a paragon of virtue regarding truth telling, denied the accusation. Nevertheless, after furious efforts in Qatar, about nine pm east coast time on January 16, the Prime Minister issued another statement that in Qatar the Israeli and Hamas negotiating teams had signed off on the ceasefire and hostage-release deal, signifying that the impasse had been resolved, it appears, without Hamas being granted its new demand. As a result, the security cabinet voted to approve the deal early in the afternoon of January 17 in Israel and the full cabinet will approve the deal later in the day (despite earlier reporting that it would not convene until the following day). Then, because Israeli law requires 24 hours for an aggrieved party to petition Israel’s high court after cabinet approval, and because the high court has agreed to meet over the weekend should anyone do so, it appears that the first hostages will still be released on Sunday, January 19. Should there be a snafu, the release and implementation of the deal will be delayed until Monday, January 20.
If the last-minute maneuvering is not complicated enough, it is merely a harbinger for discerning what the deal is, its flaws, and what may come. This is because despite much reporting of the purported terms, much remains ambiguous as to what has been agreed upon and ramifications. And there is the great unknown regarding side deals and threats.
Because of the confusion and constant changes, I held off writing this essay out of concern that the lack of clarity and constant change would render wrong whatever I write. However, since opinions are now forming about what is happening that may end up cast in concrete even if new contrary facts arise, because hopes are rising but so is the danger, and political accusations and trumpeting of favored politicians (no pun intended) is becoming more prevalent, I decided now is the time to lay out what I currently believe are the precise terms of the proposed agreement, what remains ambiguous, and the hurdles that remain. What I will not do is posit an opinion as to the intent of political actors and their benefit/detriment to the process. Not because I don’t have them, but I think for me to express them is counterproductive for properly evaluating the complexity of the issues involved and the likelihood, given our lack of knowledge regarding what has gone on behind the scenes, that our positive or negative opinions of political leaders will be more shaped by our past views of them than the present reality before them and us.
Nor will I go into detail in this essay about the factors that may have produced this agreement now rather than in May 2024 when much, if not all of this deal, was agreed upon after which (as has been confirmed by both President Biden and Secretary of state Blinken) Hamas reneged. Except this. Since May:
The IDF killed Yayha Sinwar, the murderous leader of Hamas who instigated October 7, and Mohammed Deif, the capable and murderous organizer and commander of Hamas’ military forces.
The IDF has now pretty much finished dismembering Hamas’ trained military wing but still faces thousands of newly recruited raw and untrained fighters.
The IDF has killed Hassan Nasrallah and severely weakened Hezbollah, leaving Hamas relatively unsupported by the remaining Iranian proxies.
Syria has fallen, cutting off Iran from Hezbollah and eliminating at least temporarily another front for Israel to contend with.
Iran has been significantly weakened.
The United States has better demonstrated its support for Israel most recently by engaging in cooperative strikes on the Houthis; and
President-elect Donald Trump has injected fears, concerns, and uncertainties for Israel’s foes with his “hell to pay” statement if a deal is not done by his inauguration on January 20, but also to some yet unknown extent has impacted Israeli decision making out of hopes that a better relationship with the United States is possible with the incoming Trump administration if Israel accepts that it has less wiggle room when American demands are made on it.
So, with the above in mind, let’s take a deep dive in. First, I will present the terms of the hostage deal as I now understand them after having collated information reported by numerous sources. Then, I will present the problems ambiguities the terms present and the challenges ahead. Then I will express my view. But before I do so, it is important to recognize that the agreement contemplates three phases, but only Phase One has been negotiated. Phases two and three are left for the future as I will explain below. Therefore, there is no overall deal—just a provisional agreement to release some hostages in return for very significant and damaging Israeli concessions.
The Hostage Deal as It Now Stands
There are three phases of the deal: Phase One is the product of detailed negotiations; Phase Two has not been addressed in any manner; and Phase three is more inspirational and requires vast outside financial help from parties that have not yet stepped forward to do so. Nothing is promised for Phases Two and Three and there is nothing promising on the horizon for one to reasonably conclude that the parties will ever reach agreement on Phase Two, which is the predicate before negotiations can start on an equally nebulous Phase Three.
On Sunday, January 19 (or possibly January 20), at 12:15 pm, Phase One will commence with a ceasefire followed by periodic release of some Israeli hostages held by Hamas and its brethren. Mediators from the United States, Qatar and Egypt will monitor the agreement. Below, I will break Phase One down into five components: Hamas’ release of hostages and Israel’s release of terrorists; movement of the IDF in Gaza; movement of Gazans in Gaza; humanitarian aid; and the subject and timing of future negotiations for phases two and three.
Hamas Release of Hostages and Israel’s Release of Terrorists
Israel believes that Hamas and its fellow terror armies in Gaza hold 98 hostages of which about 35 are dead.
In Phase one, Hamas will release 33 hostages of which 21-25 will be alive and the remainder bodies of deceased hostages.
The live hostages released will be women, children, men over 50, and those that are sick or wounded plus two Israelis that have been held for a very longtime—one since 2014 and the other since 2015. Of the hostages being released alive or dead, there are ten women and two children plus 10 men over 50 plus 11 men under 50. Each category of hostage comes with a different price—Israel must release specified numbers of imprisoned terrorists who have committed the worst atrocities (serving life sentences) and let go other terrorists who have committed a variety of terrorist acts:
In return for release of 9 sick or injured Israelis, Israel will release 110 Palestinians given life sentences for murdering Israelis.
The price for each elderly male hostage released (over 50) is 3 terrorists serving life sentences plus 27 serving other sentences for a total of 30 terrorists released for each elderly man.
The two Israelis held since 2014 and 2015 will be freed in return for Israel releasing 30 terrorists for each of them plus 47 terrorists that were re-arrested for new terrorist acts after they were released in 2011 in the Shalit prisoner exchange when Israel returned 1,027 terrorists for one soldier held by Hamas.
For each of the 5 female soldiers among the total of 10 adult females thought to be held by Hamas, Israel is required to release fifty terrorists.
For each of the other women and children released by Hamas, Israel will release thirty terrorists that are women or teenagers.
The terrorist charge for bodies (it is not clear to me the number) will be paid by releasing the requisite negotiated number of women and children.
Israel will also release 1,000 terrorists captured in Gaza on October 8, 2023, or later, but no terrorist will be released that participated in the October 7 massacre.
The pace and timing of the hostage release is dictated by the agreement as follows:
on January 19, Hamas will release three hostages;
on day 7 of the deal, Hamas will release four more hostages;
then three more on the 14th day;
and then three more on the 21st day for a total of thirteen hostages released by day 21.
After day 21, Hamas will release the remaining 8-12 live hostages and 8-12 hostage bodies (total of live + dead = 33) over the next 21 days with the principle being live hostages and females should go first (I see no guarantee of that happening though).
Hamas will release hostages early at night or in the morning of the designated day and then the commensurate number of terrorists will be released by Israel later that same day.
It is still not clear where released terrorists will go. But some will be transported to Qatar, Turkey or Egypt; others will be sent back into Gaza; and some might be allowed to return to Judea and Samaria (West Bank) but the details of this have not been released.
Movement of the IDF in Gaza
Most, if not all, of the IDF’s movements in Phase One are delineated on maps that are part of the agreement but that have not been revealed at this time.
The IDF will withdraw from densely populated areas of Gaza.
The IDF may remain inside Gaza in any area within 700 meters (approximately 700 yards) from Gaza’s northern and western border with Israel except for in five “localized locations” determined by Israel where they may extend their presence 400 meters further (one document I reviewed could be read to say 400 meters less rather than more).
In the Philadelphi corridor, which is a thin strip of land along Gaza’s southern border with Egypt under which Hamas built many tunnels used to smuggle weapons, weapon factories, and tunnel building materials, the IDF will begin to withdraw its forces during the first 41 days of the deal. On day 42 it will accelerate its withdrawal and complete it on day 50 contingent on completion before, of a Phase Two agreement.
Near Rafah, where Egypt operates the Rafah crossing into Gaza, the IDF will redeploy from its seven bases in the Philadelphi corridor to three near the Rafah crossing to monitor comings and goings. The Rafah crossing will be operated according to the agreement reached in May 2024 (not clear what is) but that Hamas backed out of.
As part of its redeployment, the IDF will move out of the Netzarim corridor which it currently occupies that divides northern Gaza from southern Gaza.
Movement of Gazans in Gaza
Movement of Gazans in southern Gaza to northern Gaza will be permitted as delineated in the agreement reached in May 2024 (not clear what that is) but that Hamas backed out of.
Gazans pedestrians may on day one walk from southern Gaza into northern Gaza via Rashid Street and back. They are not allowed to carry weapons, but they will not have to undergo inspections to ensure that they comply with the rules.
On day 7 of the deal, vehicles may travel from southern Gaza into northern Gaza and back via Rashid Street. However, they may not carry weapons and must undergo an inspection. The inspectors will be employees of a third-party company chosen by the mediators and approved by Israel.
On day 22, Gazan pedestrians may also travel from south to north Gaza via Salah Din street under the same conditions as above.
Beginning after the last female hostage is released, up to 50 wounded Hamas fighters accompanied by as many as three other individuals may cross each day from Gaza into Egypt through the Rafah crossing. However, those crossing must be approved by both Israel and Egypt.
Ill and wounded Palestinian civilians will be permitted to cross from Gaza into Egypt via the Rafah crossing (numbers and other details are not clear).
Humanitarian Aid
Israel will permit at least 600 trucks to enter Gaza each day that are filled with humanitarian needs under a protocol agreed on by the mediators (Israel now permits hundreds to cross that presently are sufficient to feed Gazans and provide medical care – the problems of dissemination of the aid are on the Gaza side and mostly caused by Hamas, other criminal gangs, and relief organization capacity).
I saw some mention of Israel allowing into Gaza a vast number of temporary homes and tents, presumably destined for northern Gaza which has been greatly devastated by the fighting.
Phases Two and Three
Negotiations for Phase Two will begin on the 16th day of Phase One. The announced goal is to reach an agreement that releases all remaining hostages (live and dead) in return for the IDF’s compete withdrawal from Gaza and a permanent ceasefire.
If negotiations have not reached a positive conclusion, they are to continue past the 42 days of Phase One and the United States, Qatar, and Egypt will remain involved to ensure that an agreement is reached. Furthermore, while these negotiations are ongoing, even if they extend past the 42 days of Phase One, the agreements in Phase One will remain in place, i.e. a ceasefire, IDF’s redeployment, movement of Gazans, etc.
The date for Phase Three negotiations to commence is not specified but the goal is provision for the reconstruction of Gaza. The reconstruction will be supervised by Qatar, Egypt, and the United Nations (not the U.S) and presumably not start until a Phase Two deal is reached.
The Good and the Bad and the Ambiguous
First the good news.
Time is running out for the hostages. Now, at least some hostages will come home, and some bodies of the deceased will return to their families. The benefit of this is immeasurable for the individuals and families involved and will help heal the Israeli people that despite their victories have been traumatized by October 7 and the war in its aftermath.
The 700-meter manned buffer zone inside Gaza, with five 400-meter exceptions, as long as it exists will make it much more difficult for Hamas’ terrorists to penetrate Israel’s border to cause more mayhem.
There is no provision in the agreement that requires Israel to end the war. This is important because Israel cannot permit Hamas to remain as a governing entity in Gaza. Nor can it ignore any Hamas or other Gazan terrorist violations of the ceasefire in Phase One or any future phases. Those violations must be met with disproportionate force that will ensure violations will not happen again. Not through deterrence but by eliminating the threat. Also, by not including an end of war provision, Israel has some remaining leverage to effect its goals in Phase Two negotiations.
There is no role contemplated in any of the phases for the Palestinian Authority that now incompetently governs Judea and Samaria where, by its actions, it promotes terrorism and has failed to rein in the rise of Hamas there.
But then, the bad news.
Hamas has provided Israel with a list of those that will be released, but no reporting as to which are alive, and which are dead. Nor are they required to do so until day 7 after the deal is implemented. Nor does there appear to be specific agreement as to who will be released when in the first phase. All of this creates unnecessary emotional angst and uncertainty in Israel and gives Hamas flexibility to play with the order of release to heighten the drama. Nevertheless, there seems to be some thought in Israel that women and children will be released first.
By Israel’s count, at the end of Phase One, there will still be 65 hostages in Gaza, of which perhaps forty will still be alive. Most of them are likely males under fifty of which many are IDF soldiers. Hamas’ price for their release will be much higher and quite likely unbearable. I am concerned for their survival. This is why some hostage families oppose the deal because its provisions do not require the release of all hostages in Phase One.
The principle has been further established that taking hostages gets good results. Israel made that mistake when it released 1,150 terrorists for the return of three soldiers. Many of those terrorists participated in the first intifada. After their release they killed Jews in busses, in cafes, and on the street. Then, in 2011, Israel released 1,027 terrorists for one captured soldier. Some of those terrorists participated in Hamas’ attack on October 7 and one, Yahya Sinwar, planned the October 7 attack and led Hamas on that infamous day. The captives Hamas took on October 7 were its insurance policy. But for those hostages, this war would have been over and Hamas as a governing organization eliminated. By Israel releasing terrorists now, more hostages will be taken later in future terror operations—not just Israelis but westerners too, like Hezbollah did in Lebanon decades ago. Now hostage taking may become more common place—not just where there are ongoing wars but anywhere in the world. Already, there are indications that Iran is attempting to take hostage Israelis abroad. Soon that will likely be broadened to Jews and then Americans and then anybody whose capture would assert pressure to achieve some terrorist goal.
Where will the released terrorists go? If back to Gaza they will reinforce Hamas’ forces. If in Judea or Samaria, they will contribute to undermining the stability of the region. If to exile in Qatar or Turkey or elsewhere, some will infiltrate back to Gaza or Judea or Samaria where they will create havoc. But if they remain abroad that will be bad too. There, they may unsettle their initial host countries or other nations they eventually move to; popularize Hamas’ vision; fundraise; or do whatever is necessary to support Hamas’ goals from the outside.
Absent the use of military force by Israel or other countries, the agreement almost certainly ensures that Hamas will remain in power in Gaza. Over time, this will inevitability lead to Hamas building the capability to threaten Israel again. That will contribute to unrest in Judea and Samaria and elsewhere where the lesson learned by Hamas’ survival is that perseverance and ignoring the well-being of fellow citizens may lead to victory.
With the return of Gazans to the north, should Hamas violate the ceasefire, it will be very difficult for Israel to renew its campaign to eliminate Hamas. Today, the coast is clear. Gazan citizens are clustered in an area for the most part now out of harm’s way. In a few weeks that will no longer be the case. For Israel to renew its offensive it will once again have to move Gazans, and many will die while Hamas once again hides behind them and attempts to prevent their transfer. The world will then explode with even greater fury than what we have seen over the past fifteen months. That is not to say that Israel should not or will not do what it needs to do—only that the price for Israel and Gazan civilians will be higher if they have free movement throughout Gaza before Hamas is eliminated.
There is no provision that I am aware of that will keep Hamas from confiscating the additional humanitarian supplies called for in Phase One, thus swelling the coffers of Hamas, increasing its provisions, and making sure that Gazans support Hamas lest they lose access to food, medicine, and housing.
When Israeli hostages start coming home in small weekly batches, Israelis will be overjoyed but even more concerned when confronted with the reality of what they have gone through and the reality of what the remaining hostages continue to face. This will create a tsunami of demands to agree to anything that will result in the return of the remaining hostages—therefore strengthening Hamas’ hand and making negotiations for Phase Two difficult to reach fruition short of Israeli capitulation.
When Gazans start moving north, so to will weapons. The system envisioned to prevent that is illusory nonsense.
And finally, the ambiguities and unknowns.
President Trump’s incoming national security advisor recently stated that Hamas should have no role in governing Gaza in the future and that there is no special exception for Hamas that holds it apart from the treatment given to Al Qaeda and ISIS. And furthermore, he said that the ceasefire does not put an end to Israel’s overarching objective of dismantling Hamas and demilitarizing Gaza. How that would be accomplished is unknown and difficult to discern if the IDF withdraws from Gaza.
Somehow, for Phase Three, a role was carved out for the United Nations to be involved in Gazan reconstruction. That is likely a recipe for a future disaster.
What exactly will happen if negotiations for Phase Two go nowhere? Given Hamas’ achievements in Phase One, they might well be happy with the status quo that gives them an opportunity to ensure its control over Gaza, rearm by opening new smuggling routes under the Philadelphi corridor, spread back in force to northern Gaza, enrich itself by impounding and then selling incoming humanitarian aid, and rebuilding its tunnels structure for future defense and creation of new underground missile factories, etc. Will Israel then have the backing of the United States to renew the conflict and at what cost in soldiers’ lives and national treasure?
For those Gazans that return to northern Gaza, many will find rubble where their homes once stood. How will they be housed? Who will ensure that food supplies reach them? Israel will not be there, but Hamas will!
Even if things work out better than I suspect will be the case, without outside military forces to protect a nascent government in its initial stages, if not uprooted, Hamas will remain a potent force that will influence government decisions towards a path that allows Hamas to grow and prosper. This is what happened in Lebanon with Hezbollah. Israel cannot afford to allow it to happen in Gaza.
Did Israel receive any assurances from the incoming Trump administration concerning Iran or other things that have not been made public? While I hope that is the case, a report on January 16 that representatives of the incoming administration have warned Israel to not let the ceasefire with Hezbollah lapse gives me concerns. That sounds like pressure on Israel to accept some level of Hezbollah violations. That too would be a loud warning for America’s position regarding future Hamas violations of the deal. We will know more about America’s position on January 27 when Israel is supposed to withdraw from Lebanon but is reluctant to do so because of Hezbollah violations and the LAF’s so far failure to take a sufficiently active role to root out Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
MY VIEW
Israel has made an emotional and very personal decision to secure the release of some hostages at the expense of the likelihood of no imminent, and possibly never, release of the majority of hostages still alive in Gaza. By doing so, it has also jeopardized the security of the nation by accepting conditions that will make it more likely that Hamas will grow back and continue to enslave the Gazan people in furtherance of its desire to kill Jews and destroy Israel.
Although some seek guidance from Jewish religious texts, I am not one of them. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not inform you that there is a Jewish concept of pidyon shvuyim that prioritizes ransoming hostages. However, that is juxtaposed against other Jewish religious teaching that forbids a deal if it will lead to more kidnapping, terror, and bloodshed. Release of so many terrorists will lead to more terror that will kill future civilians. Knuckling under when victory over Hamas is in Israel’s grasp will lead to more kidnapping. And righting the wrong if Hamas retains control of Gaza will lead to the loss of many more soldier lives than otherwise would be the case because the likelihood is high that this will not be the last conflict with Hamas that now will have the opportunity to retrench, reorganize, and rearm.
It is also my sense that a better deal was to be had in the near term future as the IDF continues to chop away at Hamas and especially if the incoming administration were supportive of wiping out Iran’s nuclear program and remaining economic wherewithal, leaving Hamas with nowhere to turn.
In addition, the images that will play around the world of Gazans returning to the devastation in northern Gaza will hurt Israel, further restrict its ability to defend itself, and contribute to the rise of antisemitism. Perhaps all of that is inevitable. But to have Hamas still standing and now waving the flag of victory will embolden Jihadists everywhere.
Then there is the issue of the hundreds of soldiers that died fighting in Gaza and the thousands maimed and otherwise injured. Were they fighting just to secure the release of the hostages or to secure the nation? What do they think and what do their families think? Frankly, I have no idea but suspect that not finishing the job will dismay many.
And finally, commanders have ordered soldiers to war throughout history. Sometimes those wars are for the wrong reasons. But sometimes they are for national survival or to fight tyranny. When the order to fight is given, people die—soldiers and often civilians alike. That is what happened when Britain chose to fight against Nazi tyranny. It is what is happening in Ukraine in its fight against Russia. And it is what Israel has been forced to do since its battle for independence in 1948. History has seen civilians die by the hundreds or thousands in the cause of liberty. The hostages, for the most part, were not soldiers. None of them should have to die. Few if any chose to put themselves in a position where their death was a real possibility. But there they are. Does that make them any different than the soldier on the battlefield, or the young mother clutching her baby in a shelter while the Germans blitzed London? Are they entitled to membership in a special class for which a nation will endure more pain than if they were a civilian on their home ground? Some think yes. I think somewhat. But still I think the cost in future lives should not unbearably outweigh the number saved.
Nevertheless, I am not an Israeli. Therefore, it is not my choice to make. And although I can’t say with certainty that Israel’s soul would wither if a deal were not made now there is that risk. Especially because in Israel there are many interconnections between families and friends and perhaps for some, saving the hostages makes up in some small way for the failures of October 7. And I can say with certainty that if no deal is made in the near future, all the hostages will suffer, families will remain dysfunctional, and many more hostages will eventually die. Meanwhile, Israel will be emotionally torn by the conflict between their hearts and minds. Are those sufficient reasons to jeopardize the nation’s needs and to put many more Israelis at risk of injury and death than now might be saved among the hostages still held in Gaza? That is for Israel to answer, not us.
For me, I will be joyful for those released, fearful for what those left behind and what their families will continue to endure perhaps till their deaths and deeply concerned for the impact of the deal on Israel’s future. And, I’m concerned that if Hamas remains viable, this deal will not end the conflict but only serve to set the stage for a new round. As for us, I believe we need to understand that we live in a universe of gray. Few things are white or black when it comes to death and suffering. I guess I will just have to live with that and hope that much good will come from what I fear is wrong.
.
Hamas’ Hospital Warfare Strategy—Written by LTC Nadav Shoshani for the IDF Spokesperson’s Office Substack—January 8, 2025
Inside Bashar Assad’s Detention Centers, Where ‘death was the least bad thing’—Written by Sarah El Deeb and MALAK HARB for AP—January 7. 2025
Inside the Lebanon-Border Closed Military Zone, Kibbutz Members Prepare to Start Over—Written by Dianna Bletter for The Times of Israel—Janaury 8, 2025
Israel Offers $933 Million to Returning Northern Evacuees—Written by Canaan Lidor for Jewish News Syndicate—January 5, 2025
Israel Lays Out NIS 3.4 Billion Plan to Get Northerners Back Home in March—Written by Sharon Wrobel for The Times of Israel—January 5, 2025
Evacuation of Israel’s North Set a Dangerous Precedent, Says Galilee Leader—Written by Mike Wagenheim for the Jewish News Syndicate—January 12, 2025
Good News and Bad News From Lebanon as Nawaf Salam Elected Premier—Written by Hussain Abdul-Hussain for The Foundation for Defense of Democracies—January 15, 2025
Nawaf Salam Appointed as Lebanon's New Prime Minister in Landmark Political Shift - Explainer—Written by Steve Ganot/The Media Line—January 14, 2025
'There are nights we'll never forget': Up Close with the Arrow Air Defense System—Written by Lior Ohana for Ynet News—Janaury 13, 2025
CBS 60 Minutes Platforms Anti-Israel Voices in Skewed Segment—Written by Chaim Lax for Honest Reporting—January 13, 2025
Waves of Israeli, US Strikes Slam Houthi Weapons Sites, Target Leaders - Updates, Video—Written by David Bender for his Substack—January 10, 2025
Israel, US, UK Launch Coordinated Airstrikes on Houthi Stronghold in Yemen—Written by AMICHAI STEIN, YONAH JEREMY BOB, DANIELLE GREYMAN-KENNARD Amichaei Stern and others for The Jerusalem Post—January 11, 2025.
Taboo No More: One in Five Golan Druze Now Holds Israeli Citizenship—Written by Fadi Amun in partnership with Shomrim for The Times of Israel—January 6, 2025
How Amnesty International Became Its Own Repressive Regime—Written by Seth Mandel for Commentary—January 7, 2025
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
This is a desperate situation, I both fear and feel full of dread as to the hostages treatment over the past 15 months. I desperately want them to be returned to their loved ones. But as Alan Dershowitz has said, this isn't so much a deal, but an extortion! I do not feel optimistic that the whole 'deal' will be adhered to, the chance of it unravelling must be high. Is it the right 'deal'? I don't feel confident to answer. But, will this lead to better things, I seriously doubt that