Israel and Hezbollah—More War or Less Peace?
July 4, 2024 - Issue #54
October 11, 2023
Israel’s warplanes soared skyward, one after another, coiling into an armada with singular purpose—to strike Hezbollah so hard a blow that its missile, drone, and land forces would no longer pose a devastating threat to Israel. On the ground, IDF ground forces near Israel’s border with Lebanon received an alert—full-scale war with Hezbollah was imminent. And, seeking to ensure support for what the IDF was about to do, Israeli officials contacted the United States seeking American political and logistical support. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Israelis living in the border region, who already were dodging Hezbollah’s attacks that began on October 8, received an alert to go to shelters now.
The pressure on Israel’s decision-makers and the IDF was immense. Hezbollah has ten times the firepower of Hamas and for three days straight, Hezbollah had sent missiles and drones into Israel, probed the border on the ground for weaknesses that it could later take advantage of for terrorist penetrations, and knocked out some IDF sensors designed to warn of surprise attacks. Moreover, Israeli intelligence had received indications that Hezbollah would soon launch a massive attack on Israel. But Israel was determined not to be caught flatfooted again. Allowing Hezbollah to strike first could needlessly cost thousands of lives, open the door to billions of dollars of property losses, and coupled with the aftermath of Oct. 7 from which Israelis were still emotionally reeling, lead to a loss of citizen resilience that might endanger Israel’s existence.
The IDF, spearheaded by Defense Minister Gallant, vigorously argued for a preemptive attack. IDF Doctrine—that called for destroying the stronger enemy before challenging the weaker one—supported them. Therefore, they said, Hezbollah must be dealt with before Hamas. For sure there was no dispute that Hamas had shown itself capable of inflicting thorny, painful wounds that cumulatively would present threats to Israel’s security, economy, and diplomatic future in the region. And, for deterrence and credibility, there was no question that Hamas as a governing and military power must be gutted. But Hezbollah was an altogether different kettle of fish. It is the sword of Iran and unlike Hamas, it alone could deliver a crushing blow nationwide to Israel in one bloody day and then continue to do so every day for weeks thereafter. This reality, Gallant and the IDF argued, required dulling Hezbollah’s sword before rooting out Hamas’ thorns. Contingency plans to do so had long been in place. All that was now needed was the war cabinet’s permission to do so.
But Prime Minister Netanyahu was not so sure. Striking Hezbollah risked devastating consequences, not the least of which was a regional war. Neither was the United States in favor of an Israeli preemptive strike in part because the view of America’s intelligence community did not square with the Israel’s. In short, the Americans did not think it likely Hezbollah would do more than it already was doing. Therefore, President Biden spoke to Netanyahu by phone, imploring him to think it through before ordering a preemptive attack on Hezbollah.
Netanyahu promised that he would discuss things further with his people. That promise contained a hint of his mindset because the same day, at Netanyahu’s invitation, Benny Gantz joined Israel’s war cabinet as a voting member and Gadi Eisenkot joined as an observer/advisor. Earlier in each of their careers, Gantz and Eisenkot had been the highest-ranking officer of the IDF, and both previously served as IDF northern front commander, a position whose primary duty is to deal with the threat Hezbollah poses. Gantz was the leader of a political party, of which Eisenkot was a member, that opposed Netanyahu. After October 7, they then put aside their political differences with Netanyahu for the sake of unity.
Gantz and Eisenkot opposed attacking Hezbollah first. They argued that it would be better to first finish business with Hamas because going all-out against Hezbollah risked an entanglement that would risk Hamas getting a free pass for their perfidy. After hours of discussion, the war cabinet reached its decision—the IDF would first go hard after Hamas while standing down against Hezbollah, limiting itself mostly to tit-for-tat responses to Hezbollah’s attacks.
The pilots flew back to their bases and the IDF focused its attention on Gaza—leaving sufficient strength on the ground in the north to ward off any Hezbollah incursions. Days later the government ordered, in two waves, evacuation of 60,000 citizens living within five kilometers of the Lebanese border.
Nine Months Later
According to the Alma Center, Hezbollah has targeted Kiryat Shmona, a town close to the border with Lebanon, forty-five times from the beginning of the war through July 1 with a total (my estimation) of at least 500 missiles and drones. But Kiryat Shmona is not a military target, it is home to 22,000 Israelis, many of whom are descendants of Jews kicked out of where they lived in Muslim countries after Israel became a state by the governments of the countries where they lived. Elsewhere, Hezbollah has targeted other border towns and villages, each with hundreds of explosive munitions.
Neither has the IDF escaped carnage. Hezbollah’s missiles and drones have degraded IDF installations and probed their weaknesses. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s minions remain in the southern Lebanese towns and tunnels dotting the borders where, according to estimates, 1 out of every 3 civilian homes harbor hidden missiles and other weaponry. Nor has the fighting to date put a dent in Hezbollah’s supply of 200,000 missiles, thousands of which can accurately hit targets throughout Israel.
Hezbollah started its low-grade war to weaken Israel, not as it publicizes in solidarity with the people of Gaza. October 7 did not give Hezbollah a reason; it provided an opportunity that it has exploited.
Then came July 3 and 4th.
After the IDF killed a high-level Hezbollah commander responsible for commanding military units confronting Israel, Hezbollah launched 200 missiles and 20 suicide drones towards Kiryat Shmona and other locations. It was not the first time Hezbollah has done this and certainly will not be the last. Ostensibly, they were targeting IDF military installations, but the missiles Hezbollah now uses for this purpose are not accurate. They pose as much or more risk to civilian structures and people than they do to the IDF.
Hezbollah’s actions over this most recent 24-hour period should not come as a surprise because Hezbollah, a terrorist group that comprises a significant part of Lebanon’s government, has rained 5,000 missiles, drones, and projectiles throughout northern Israel over the last nine months. As a result, Israel’s northern border is barren of people, bereft of economic activity, and assailed by devastating fires set off by those attacks. Further back, much of northern Israel can be characterized as a zone of despair, where for many people living north of Haifa, fear is a constant companion, life seems out of control, businesses are failing, and a sense of despair grows as Hezbollah’s brazenness mounts. I have witnessed those feelings. What began as unacceptable has steadily increased to unimaginable as the number of missiles and drones Hezbollah launches increases, as has the range of their targets that extend deeper into Israel.
And there is no reason to believe that Hezbollah will not continue to ratchet up its activities. Here, in U.S. Secretary of State Blinken’s words, Israel has “effectively “lost sovereignty” over a wide swath of territory in the north. No nation would except this as a new normal—neither the reality of today, nor should Hezbollah cease firing for now, Hezbollah’s future capability to renew the onslaught.
As a result, Israelis in the north clamor for action. They want to return home. They want to earn a living. They want their children back in local schools. They want their lives back uninterrupted by fear and tragedy. Until then, the pain of their evacuation and the uncertainties for those that remain will cause mounting social, psychological, and economic pain. In short, Hezbollah has denied the citizens of the north normalcy and vibrancy. Furthermore, Hezbollah can turn up the heat whenever it wants by firing more and bigger rockets and drones and by sending them deeper into Israel,
Also, Israelis throughout Israel agree that the present situation is not sustainable (listen to Sarit Zehavi’s interview with Sarah Stern on July 3). Not the least of which because although Hezbollah’s short-term goal may well be solidarity with Hamas, its long- term goal, in conjunction with its master, Iran, is to destroy Israel. Northern Israel is just the first step.
Therefore, to analyze what might soon happen, over the last couple weeks I conducted interviews, including with military affairs analyst Yaakov Lappin, and reviewed other information sources.
Everybody I spoke with, and most everything I studied, agreed that all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah is inevitable. There is no wiggle room on “if,” just “when.” Furthermore, there is unanimity that Iran is behind all this. Iran created Hezbollah. Iran supplied Hezbollah with its massive missile and drone stock and Iran provided much of the funding Hezbollah needed to create its army, buy the allegiance of Shiites in Lebanon, and gain much control of Lebanon’s government. Iran’s mission is to destroy Israel, attain regional dominance and export its Islamic revolution worldwide. Because it sees the United States as an obstacle to its goals, Iran views America an enemy, and happily kills Americans when Iran feels it necessary. Diplomacy will not change Iran’s worldview. Nor will it change Hezbollah’s. They, like most in the Middle East, understand only one language—power and the willingness to use it.
And so, Hezbollah is Iran’s tool. A tool Iran will wield when it believes the time is right. And, in large part due to Iran’s support it is a tool that grows stronger and more capable by the day as it casts a mounting shadow over Israel. A now evacuated resident of a kibbutz near Israel’s border with Lebanon once told me that living within Hezbollah’s reach is like “Living under a volcano.” You don’t know when it will blow, but you know it eventually will. That was in 2019. Today, that volcano is spewing lava and ash.
Similarly, Iran sees in Palestinian issues a tool for weakening Israel even though Palestinians are mostly Sunni Muslims. Iran has little interest in creating a Sunni Palestinian state, but it does want to excise Jews from what it considers Muslim land. Therefore, it happily promotes, supports and exploits Hamas’ willingness to shed Palestinian blood in service of weakening Israel because Iran has no interest in a two-state solution only in Israel’s dissolution.
What Will Happen?
We can break likely events over the next weeks and months into five broad categories:
No change. Hezbollah’s continues to fire an average of 25-100 missiles and drones into Israel daily. Israel retaliates with targeted killings of Hezbollah operatives and pin prick attacks on Hezbollah’s military installations and depots.
A negotiated solution.
Hezbollah launches a surprise all-out attack.
All-out war accidentally breaks out.
Israel launches a surprise preventative attack on Hezbollah to degrade its capability to destroy large swathes of Israel, and, by doing so, creates conditions that permit evacuated Israelis to safely return home.
Also consider the advantages of attacking first:
A Hezbollah surprise attack constituting near simultaneous launch of thousands of missiles and drone in the first hours will devastate Israeli towns and cities because Iron Dome will prioritize protecting military assets and critical infrastructure. But Iron Dome is not a hermetic seal. Infrastructure and military targets will sustain damage to a level that will likely impede IDF offensive responses and defensive measures. And especially if the attack is timed for the inevitable moment when Israel has drawn down its present massive presence along the border, or when ground forces have lost alertness due to extended calm, Hezbollah’s Radwan units might successfully invade Israel to do, on a much larger scale, what Hamas accomplished October 7.
An Israeli aerial first strike would significantly degrade Hezbollah’s missile and drone stock plus eliminate many missile launchers, reducing the damage Hezbollah could inflict inside Israel. Simultaneously, IDF ground forces would move into Lebanon to root out Hezbollah’s remaining nearby offensive capability and tunnel infrastructure. Although this operation would take weeks if not months, would not eliminate Hezbollah, and would cost many IDF soldiers’ lives—it likely, in conjunction with aggressive interdiction of Iranian resupply, would end for many years the grave present threat Hezbollah poses to Israel and would set the conditions necessary for Israeli civilians to return to their homes.
So, with the above in mind, let’s consider what might happen.
All-Out Accidental War
Hezbollah started a war with Israel on October 8. For now, it is a limited one. However, an all-out war may begin even if neither side wants that to happen.
Now, Hezbollah mainly uses two types of weapons to strike Israel:
Inaccurate missiles, some with large warheads.
Accurate drones and anti-tank missiles
Israel usually responds with:
Accurate missiles fired from warplanes.
Some drone attacks.
Artillery fire.
All these strikes and counterstrikes have two inherent risks—error and unforeseen circumstances. Error is unavoidable, unforeseen circumstances always exist. Error is when you launch something that goes boom, but despite the best of intentions it doesn’t go boom where intended. Examples of unforeseen circumstances are the presence of civilians where they were not expected, or the failure of the attacker to properly appreciate how the other side will react if a specific target is destroyed, or individual killed. If a Hezbollah rocket hits an Israeli school bus filled with children, all-out war will ensue. The same might happen if an Israeli strike accidentally kills many Lebanese civilians or one-too-many high value targets.
Should an all-out accidental war start, it would be to Israel’s detriment. The IDF would not enjoy the benefit of a planned surprise attack. Therefore, it would likely not be in position to most effectively execute a rapid and pervasive strike against thousands of dug-in targets that could fire or maneuver away before the IDF can target them. Nor might the IDF’s ground forces be prepared to move rapidly into Lebanon. Hezbollah, on the other hand, has a much simpler task should it be provoked into initiating a sudden attack. It need only get its launch-on-command missiles and drones in the air and move its ground forces through tunnels to pre-determined attack sites.
Advantage Hezbollah.
Diplomatic Solution
I am not saying it won’t happen. But if it does, it would probably be a long term disaster for Israel.
The essentials of any deal are three:
Hezbollah pulls back five to seven miles (beyond the range of most anti-tank missiles).
Israel makes territorial concessions.
A mechanism to ensure Hezbollah withdraws and to deal with Hezbollah if it tries to return.
Some of the barriers to a Diplomatic Deal are:
Hezbollah conditions any diplomatic deal on there being a full ceasefire in Gaza. But what does that mean? It would be national suicide for Israel to agree to not enter Gaza in the future to eliminate rising terrorist threats. How then would Hezbollah respond?
What entity will stop Hezbollah, with its 200,000 missiles and thousands of drones and well-trained Radwan invasion unit, from attacking Israel in the future?
Hezbollah claims several small pockets of land and two larger ones (Ghajar and Sheeba Farms), now held by Israel. Ghajar, until 1967 a Syrian held town, is populated by people who once had loyalty to Syria but now have become Israeli citizens and want their town to remain part of Israel. Sheeba Farms was also Syrian until 1967, is adjacent to the Golan Heights and is high ground that looks down on northern Israel. Israel will never agree to turn over that strategic area to Hezbollah. Nor is it wise for strategy for the future for Israel to cede any territory while pressured by bombardments.
Most of Hezbollah’s highly-trained Radwan operatives live in southern Lebanon. There, in every third home and in many civilian structures, Hezbollah has placed missiles and armaments. Underneath them, tunnels connect to other tunnels farther back. As part of a diplomatic solution, will Radwan soldiers move out of their homes? Will the area be sanitized of arms? Will existing tunnels be destroyed? Not a chance. At best, we will not see uniformed soldiers or open display of weaponry as was the case a few years ago. But their ability to rapidly coalesce to invade Israel will not be impeded.
Who will enforce Hezbollah’s supposed withdrawal? Will Israel maintain the right to do so? Hezbollah would never agree to that. Will an international force take on the responsibility? The U.N. tried that with Resolution 1701, and it failed. Under the benign watch of 10,000 or more international troops, Hezbollah created a massive, fortified zone in Southern Lebanon. Nor will the Lebanese army enforce any diplomatic deal. It has not done so since May 2000 when Resolution 1701 charged it with responsibility. In fact, it has done the reverse by facilitating Hezbollah. Nor should this come as a surprise. Many of its rank and file are Shiite sympathizers of Hezbollah and its officers take orders from a government in which Hezbollah historically has had either major influence or control.
Because of these obstacles, the only thing a diplomatic solution might accomplish is to kick the can down the road to a future all-out war that will be even more destructive and deadly than if one happens now.
Advantage Hezbollah
Diplomacy Fails but No All-Out War Starts—Things Remain as They Are
Whether in conjunction with a deal with Hamas or not, one arguable advantage of this scenario for Israel is that it buys time for IDF forces to rest and better prepare for the next war with Hezbollah. Those preparations would include developing and purchasing weapons that can better deal with Hezbollah’s massive firepower—including a laser beam weapon and anti-drone and missile guns capable of cheaply shooting massive numbers of shells against missiles and drones closing into their targets. One lesson of modern missile and drone warfare defense is that quantity matters. In addition, the theory goes, during this period Israel would undertake a huge program to make its infrastructure more robust and build more shelters for its people. And, one supporter of this concept told me, if there is no deal with Hamas the IDF would be able to focus its resources on bringing the fighting in Gaza to a successful conclusion (a geopolitical necessity) while still mounting operations at the current level against Hezbollah in response to Hezbollah’s activity. In essence, this strategy would permit Israel to finish off one enemy before starting on the next. This period of hiatus before the inevitable war with Hezbollah, according to the expert I spoke to, might last from two to as many as five years.
However, this scenario comes with significant problems and much risk:
It leaves 60,000-100,000 Israelis in the north as refugees. They, and Israel as a whole, will not accept that and the evacuees will not return with their children to face an uncertain but dangerous future.
Should Hezbollah not stand down, Israel will have to bear for months or years many thousands of Hezbollah missile and drone strikes that will daily destroy property, kill IDF soldiers and those civilians that choose to live there, and further degrade Israel’s defensive capability in the region.
Iran, Hezbollah, Syrian front militias, the Houthis, and Iraqi militia will not sit idly by while Israel rearms and refits before renewing with increased strength its confrontation with Hezbollah. The region’s history teaches that Israel’s enemies will grow the quantity and lethality of their weapons and develop new strategies for devilment. Who will win this race of punch and counterpunch? That is anybody’s guess, but over the last several years, Israel’s defensive problems have become more problematic, not less, due to its enemies’ advances. Yes, Iron Dome is an extremely valuable tool. But despite its improvements, it is less of an umbrella like savior today than when it was first developed because of the size and type of forces it now faces.
Iran will almost certainly have deliverable nuclear weapons within two years and quite possibly much less (it can have weapons grade fissionable material in days if it does not already possess it). When that happens, Hezbollah will enjoy Iran’s nuclear umbrella making it more difficult for Israel to defend itself from Hezbollah.
There is no guarantee that Israel’s political system would sustain the rapid build- up necessary to make delay an advantage.
Maintaining the status quo gives Hezbollah the initiative. Then, it can do what it wants when it wants—including, increasing the numbers of missiles and drones it fires and sending them deeper into Israel—thereby necessitating more evacuations.
Whenever Israel’s elections are held, whether later this year or in 2026 when they must happen, it will be difficult for the government in power to respond forcefully to Hezbollah provocations or planned attacks because it will be accused of seeking war for political purposes.
Israel may not have the resources (manpower and economic) to maintain large forces in a high alert status along the northern borders for years. Thus, leaving the risk of another October 7 squarely on the table. And even if Israel can maintain sufficient presence to defend the border against a determined attack, it will be at huge cost for its society.
Delay does not eliminate the problem of an accidental war breaking out or a Hezbollah surprise attack.
International politics, domestic pressure to obtain release of the remaining hostages or failed policies could leave Hamas in place. Then, the idea of accepting the status quo with Hezbollah in order to take one enemy off the table will have been for nothing.
Advantage Hezbollah
Hezbollah Launches a Surprise Attack
Although Hezbollah will probably not make a unilateral decision to launch a surprise all-out surprise attack in the near future because it is imposing on Israel what it today wants to accomplish, Hezbollah probably would do so if ordered by Iran. This could happen:
If the possibility of an imminent Israeli attack is detected.
Due to perceived Israeli political or military weakness caused by domestic political strife, international approbation, military demobilization and/or complacency, or domestic demoralization.
When Iran has deliverable nuclear weapons
Nevertheless, for now, I doubt Iran would order an all-out Hezbollah attack because it finds Hezbollah’s existence too useful for warding off an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, the moment Iran sees an opportunity to strike Israel a disabling blow, you can be sure that Hezbollah will lead the charge. The danger of that will heighten if Israel relaxes or descends into political turmoil. It will reach a crescendo if Iran obtains nuclear weapons.
Advantage Hezbollah.
A Surprise Israeli Preemptive Attack on Hezbollah
Iran has made clear that it intends to destroy Israel. Hezbollah is a necessary component for doing so. Until Iran unleashes Hezbollah, it will strengthen Hezbollah while simultaneously ordering it to weaken Israel as it has already done, by challenging Israeli sovereignty through its measured use of missiles, etc. Therefore, eventually Israel will have to cut-off the head of the snake—Iran. But the road for doing so goes through eliminating Hezbollah’s ability to inflict significant harm on Israel. Otherwise, Israel will not have the capability to take decisive, direct military action against Iran to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon because Hezbollah will attack Israel through its weakened northern backdoor. Thus, Israel needs to take Hezbollah off the playing field first.
And now is the time to do so, not tomorrow, for the following reasons:
Today, Israelis citizens have been evacuated from the immediate battle zone. So too have 100,000 Lebanese left southern Lebanon. Thus, an all-out war now will inflict fewer civilian casualties than a war after they have returned.
Now, Hezbollah does not have an Iranian nuclear umbrella. Soon, it will.
Israel cannot defend its northern border in strength indefinitely. Now, its soldiers are alert. Months or years from now they will not be.
The Syrian front is manageable today without the expenditure of significant resources. That will not be the case as time goes on.
Moderate Sunni nations in the region—Israel’s present and future allies—would be supportive of degrading Hezbollah and thereby weakening Iran—although they might not publicly admit it. But that could change.
Present political turmoil in the United States will lead to future unpredictable policies. In the future, Israel may not have the window to do what it needs to do today.
Israel’s public supports such a war and northern Israeli citizens demand action.
IDF rank and file morale and confidence is soaring, and the IDF presently has the armaments necessary to fight Hezbollah.
Israel needs to move quickly and deftly to take enemy threats off the table before they further coalesce, strengthen, and increase in numbers. Time is not on Israel’s side.
Anti-Semitism worldwide will not abate while Israel’s war linger and Jews in their country and in Israel are perceived to be susceptible to attack. The only answer to Anti-Semitism is to directly confront it—where it happens and by Israel defeating its enemies. Otherwise, weakness, vacillation and appeasement will bring more of the same not less.
However, there are significant risks related to a preventative attack, not the least of which is how does such a war end? I will delve into that issue in a future newsletter but firmly believe there are strategies to accomplish that or manage the festering problem of a continuing war. Furthermore, Israeli casualties will be significant (an estimate I saw was 3,000 civilians and 800 soldiers killed), and victory would require temporary occupation of a region stretching ten miles from Israel’s border to the Litani river. Also, such an operation risks diverting resources from the fight in Gaza, but my analysis of the IDF’s force structure is that that would not be the case as fighting transitions into the predicted third phase even if in Gaza a temporary IDF military administration of a sort is required to stop Hamas from resurging.
And there are political risks—domestic and international. Within Israel, despite support for taking increased military action, I doubt many Israelis are prepared emotionally and physically for what any war with Hezbollah might bring. However, a greater war on Israel’s terms will lead to less suffering than one on Hezbollah’s terms or one kicked down the road to another time. As for international concerns, the only one that really matters is the United States and regarding America’s views, it will always be easier for Israel’s critics and supposedly neutral pundits to pontificate than those impacted to endure. In my judgement, although many in America will explode with anger and demands to castigate Israel, the United States today will support its ally. I cannot make that same judgement for the future. There are too many variables in play.
Advantage Israel
Conclusion
Israel now faces a crucial decision regarding Hezbollah that may have existential import. And it is not one that Israel’s leaders can ignore because no decision is a decision with significant impact. Furthermore, the decision that Israel must make is in the shadow of tired reservists, a difficult economy and political and emotional turmoil at home and abroad. But it also is a decision that must balance present trouble with future risk.
For us, the time has come to explain to all that would listen the conundrum that dealing with Hezbollah poses for Israel and why solving it might require a preventative attack by the IDF. And it is our responsibility to do so now, not after the fact when it is too late.
Also, if you have an interest in the danger Hezbollah presents and how it came to be, you might consider purchasing my book which can be obtained on Amazon here.
Hezbollah – Intensity and Range Analysis of Attacks Against Israel (October 8, 2023, to July 1, 2024)—Written by Dana Polak Kanarik for the Alma Research and Education Center—July 2, 2024
Daily Update July 3-4, 2024, 03:00 pm – Northern Arena—Written by Dana Polak Kanarik for the Alma Research and Education Center—July 4, 2024
The Escalation in the Drone War Between Hezbollah and Israel—Written by Liran Antebi for the Institute for National Security Studies—May 30, 2024
A New Era of Long Wars—Written by Yaakov Lappin for The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune—July 2024
A look into Lebanon: Three Israeli Experts Discuss a Potential War with Hezbollah - Interview—Written by Ohad Merlin for the Jerusalem Post—June 27, 2021
In Northern Israel, Emptied Villages and Talk of War in Lebanon—Written by Seth J. Frantzman for Breaking Defense—June 28, 2024
Israel’s Double-Edged Sword (Part I)
Israel’s Double-Edged Sword (Part II)
Israel’s Double-Edged Sword (Part III)
Experts: ICC and UN Blamed Israel for a Famine That Never Happened in Gaza - Exclusive—By Seth J. Frantzman fro the Jerusalem Post—June 18, 2024
Israeli Foreign Minister Decries ‘Grossly Erroneous’ UN Data on Hamas War—Written by Mike Wagenheim for Jewish News Syndicate—June 21, 2024
In Rafah, IDF Focuses on Tunnels, with Aim of Destroying Hamas Brigade Within a Month—Written by Emanuel Fabian for the Times of Israel—June 19, 2024
US Hasn’t Withheld Weapons for Israel, but it’s Done Fast-Tracking Them — Official—Written by Brian Magid for the Times of Israel—June 23, 2024
Washington Post Foreign Desk, Accused of Pro-Hamas Bias, Teems with Al Jazeera Veterans—Written by Joseph Simonson for the Free Beacon—June 19, 2024
The Day-After Plan for Gaza on Israeli Leaders’ Desks—Written by Lahov Arkov for Jewish Insider—June 26, 2024
How Does the IDF Dismantle Hamas Strongholds in Rafah?—Written by Amir Bohbot for the Jerusalem Post—June 23, 2024
A New Perspective on the Palestinians' Cherished Catastrophe—Written by Paul Finlayson for Future of Jewish—June 21, 2024
Jewish Camps Prepare for a Different Kind of Summer—Written by Paula Jacobs for Tablet—Jun 17, 2024
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
What an amazing summary of what happened, is happening, and might happen in the near future.
Must read article 👍