Israel and Hezbollah - A Tale of Ticking Clocks and Raining Rockets
July 28, 2024 - Issue #56
A few days ago, Israel announced that the evacuated children of the north will not be returning to their home schools. Now, their uncertain future will extend into a second year because Hezbollah’s rockets and drones have denied them their homes. That three-mile region extending south from Israel’s border with Lebanon will not hear their voices, not see them at play, and not see their joy—only more war.
Then, to add an exclamation point to the dangers children face in the border region, during the evening of July 27, a Hezbollah Falaq-1 rocket landed on a soccer field filled with Druze children in the Druze town of Majdal Shams—killing 12 kids and injuring about 50. Hezbollah at first claimed responsibility for firing a Falaq-1 rocket at an IDF post on a mountain top some distance away. But then—fearing Druze, Israeli and international retribution—Hezbollah tried to distance itself by belatedly denying any role in the children’s death. Nobody believes them.
How Israel will react remains to be seen. Druze citizens of Israel serve in the IDF. Most eligible Druze in Majdal Shams do not, mainly because they have not accepted Israeli citizenship, in large part out of fear that their town will be returned to Syria one day (this concern has lessened over the last few years). However, I think Israel must be very sensitive to Druze outrage and demands for reprisals at least equal to what Druze perceive Israel would do if the children had been Jewish. Will this evolve into escalating tit-for-tat strikes leading to an unintended all-out war as I have discussed in precious newsletters, will Israel’s response be one and done and unmet by Hezbollah, or will Israel consider launching a preventative attack at a time of its choosing? We will soon know.
And so, the clock is ticking—actually, many clocks—all intertwined, all at a different pace. Viewed together, they shed light regarding the timing of a war that might come because, as I have written many times before, Israelis are united that their loss of sovereignty in the north is intolerable, and they are determined not to allow it to continue. The awful death of those children could light the fire, but just at a grizzly minimum, it doubles down on the argument—Hezbollah must go.
To identify the window for war in the north these racing clocks portend is the purpose of the remainder of this essay.
The Clocks
Israel’s Knesset (legislative body)/Netanyahu’s – The Knesset will be in recess from July 30 through October 26. During this time certain committees can meet for discussion but cannot vote. More importantly, during this time, absent usage of particularly arcane and unlikely maneuvers, it is impossible for the Knesset to issue a no confidence vote that would lead to new elections that likely would mean the end of Netanyahu’s government.
The U.S. Election is November 5.
Rainy season begins in November in northern Israel and extends through the winter.
The Democratic convention is August 19-22.
If there is a hostage deal, most likely the first phase will include a 42 day pause during which some hostages, but nowhere near all, will be returned by Hamas. Assuming a deal by Sunday, August 4 – that would mean, absent further negotiation, the first phase would end about September 15.
Assumptions
During Netanyahu’s speech to Congress on July 24, he made clear that regarding the north, Israel prefers a diplomatic solution, but it will do what it needs to do.
A Harris presidency will likely be more challenging for Israel than the present administration.
President Biden will be free of personal political considerations over the remaining months of his presidency which will end on January 20, 2025. But more practically, after the election, Biden, should he choose to, would be even freer to follow his heart rather than be concerned with politics. This could be either good or bad for Israel, but my instinct is it would be better for Israel than if he were still running or remaining in office.
Should President Trump win the election, his views of Netanyahu, and perhaps more importantly, Netanyahu’s potential successors remain unpredictable. And while the common wisdom is that a Trump administration would be better for Israel in the short term, that too would become less certain as months and events intervene. Meanwhile, the only certainty is that support for Israel would become less bipartisan as it becomes further intertwined with America’s increasingly vitriolic domestic politics.
Israel’s best chance to decisively win a war against Hezbollah that almost all thinks will be fought within two years, is to strike first and sooner rather than last or later (see the July 4 Issue #54 of my newsletter titled Israel and Hezbollah—More War or Less Peace?)
My Take Regarding Israel’s Window for Launching a Preventative Strike Against Hezbollah
First, let me make clear—I am not making a prediction—only analyzing time clocks. Facts on the ground may override time’s ticktock (as just happened at Majdal Shams). So too, a lack of decisiveness, Hezbollah’s conduct, or even a diplomatic breakthrough could close some windows and open others. Nevertheless, I see a three-week period from September 16 to October 7 (I swear I did not cook my calculations to come up with an October 7 date) as the best time for Israel to make its move against Hezbollah should it decide to do so.
I will explain why—in order of clocks.
The first clock is the Knesset/Netanyahu one. I have no doubt that Netanyahu would like to remain Prime Minister. I also have no doubt, contrary to his detractors, that he would like to see the hostages come home. I regard the blathering of his political opponents in Israel and abroad that he is singularly putting his interest over Israel’s as opportunistic even though they may well contain a kernel of truth. In my opinion, there is a blend of things tugging at Netanyahu some good and some bad. But this is true of any leader, especially when they must make the least bad rather than the most good decision. Nevertheless, due to the far-right elements of his coalition, I also have no doubt that Netanyahu’s government would fall should he agree to the now proposed hostage deal.
That is why the Knesset going into recess is such an important clock. By making a hostage deal during that time, Netanyahu will not likely face a no confidence vote until late October. However, if he can point to another success—eliminating Hezbollah’s threat—behind which most of Israel is united even if it comes at significant cost—Netanyahu might well survive an attempt to unseat him.
And furthermore, as a patriot (even if only in part as argued by many), Netanyahu must be aware that if he does not act militarily against Hezbollah before he is potentially unseated by the Knesset after its return, during the several month period between elections and forming a new government—likely extending into February or March— Israel will unlikely have the wherewithal to act decisively leaving its northern citizens with all their travail and Hezbollah with the initiative into seeming perpetuity.
Thus, should Netanyahu decide that a preemptive strike against Hezbollah is warranted, he must do it soon enough so that the populace would recognize victory before any no confidence vote and importantly, before Hezbollah and Iran get ideas of their own. Given that I have seen estimates that it could Israel up to a week to destroy most of Hezbollah’s missile and other strategic sites, plus another week or two for ground forces to take significant control of southern Lebanon, that would require, for strict Knesset related political reasons, at least three weeks of acting fighting before the Knesset comes back from recess—meaning that a preventative strike must occur on or before October 7.
The second clock is the U.S. election. Although early balloting will begin before, most ballots will likely be cast on November 5. Should Israel launch a preemptive attack on Hezbollah in the days leading up to the election it surely would have an unpredictable impact on the election. And while that would not be good, it is the aftermath that would be worse. Inevitably, Jews and Israel (and make no mistake, despite hopes of some Jews that these two terms are different, for a growing number of our haters they are one and the same) would receive blame from the losing side for its defeat. And while this likely will be the case anyway, those that claim that would be much more strident and vocal if Israel initiates an all-out war very close to election day.
The third clock involves weather. I have been in northern Israel during its rainy season. It’s not pretty. Frequently, there was fog so thick in the border region that I could barely see the end of my vehicle let alone the road. Often, I wondered if these conditions were conducive to Hezbollah terrorist penetrations along the route I was driving—but then would take comfort in the fact that while I would not be able to see them, they also would not be able to target me! And the rains are not simple showers. They are deluges with massive flooding. I simply do not see how Israel could effectively prosecute an air campaign, let alone a ground campaign, if it had to deal too with the vagaries of weather. Thus, any offensive that requires meticulous planning rather than just brute force would risk being difficult to initiate from November through February.
Which leads us to the U.S. Democratic party-political clock.
Absent something catastrophic happening in the next few weeks (I wrote this before the Majdal Shams attack), it is inconceivable that Israel would risk launching an aggressive strike on Hezbollah before the Democratic convention ends August 22. Already, the Jewish State faces much approbation from powerful, mostly leftist elements of the democratic party. Initiating a devastating exchange of fire that could easily bring in Iran and possibly the United States before democrats conduct their convention which they universally consider a crucial part of their electioneering could serve to sever democratic support for some time to come from an Israel sure to be embattled for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is unlikely that Israel would launch an all-out attack on Hezbollah until at least a few days after the convention ends on August 22.
Which then leads us to the clock constraints imposed on Israel by a hostage deal. I find it hard to believe, although not impossible, that should a deal be made, Israel would take actions during the initial first-phase, 42-day period that would jeopardize getting its first tranche of hostages back. Although in theory, should Hezbollah and Israel become further entangled during the first of three phases of the hostage deal that should not impact what Hamas does, in practice that is exceedingly unlikely, and I doubt Israel’s public would forgive Netanyahu for imploding the deal soon after it starts. However, I am exceedingly pessimistic that phases two or three will go smoothly and/or that Hamas will comply with what it might initially agree to. Also possible, is that although Hezbollah might initially stop firing if the guns quiet in Gaza, it will find ways to ratchet up the pressure on Israel as time goes on. That is why I see September 16, the potential day after the first phase in Gaza would end if a deal is concluded by August 4, as the beginning window for Israel to do what it may decide it needs to do with Hezbollah. By then, Israel will know if its goals regarding Hamas can be accomplished, at least some (perhaps the majority) of the live hostages will have come home, and the IDF will have had a seven-week respite to prepare.
But, let me be clear. I do not want a greater war in the north for it would be devastating for Lebanon and Israel. However, because I see little chance for a viable diplomatic solution, I do not see any other way out of the gordian knot Israel faces—either give up its land to Hezbollah’s whims or fight for Israel’s sovereignty and freedom. In my judgement, diplomacy may only have 45 days to succeed. Let’s hope the diplomats do but prepare as if they will not. That means we must explain to all that will listen why an all-out war will come, why the advantage goes to who strikes first (see my July 4 newsletter), and why all-out war may be very imminent.
Two Speeches
As followers of this newsletter know, I try mightily to avoid making any political pronouncements regarding who I favor or disfavor in Israeli or American politics. This newsletter is about Israel, especially Hezbollah and now Hamas, and the impact of policy and events—not about the individuals who make the decisions or who are running for office. Therefore, please do not try divine my political views from what I am about to say—for that is not the intent of my advocacy nor am I trying to leave clues that can wrongly be construed one way or another.
Nevertheless, I feel a need to remark about what linked the two powerful political speeches given by the leaders of Israel and America on July 24—one by Prime Minister Netanyahu before Congress in the afternoon and the other by President Biden in the evening. They were vastly different in style and content. I believe both were delivered from the heart even though both contained political overtones. But what linked them were both their detractors and their purpose.
Regarding Netanyahu, cynicism and criticism came mostly from the left. Regarding Biden, cynicism and criticism came mostly from the right. Yet what they both spoke about is what each believed crucial for the survival of their respective nations, whether or not one agrees with them. Netanyahu spoke eloquently about the survival of Israel, the resilience and multi-ethnic nature of its warriors, the barbarity of Israel’s and America’s enemies, the scourge of antisemitism, and his hopes and dreams for the future. It was a huge opportunity, which he rose to, to reacquaint the American people, some numbed by the passage of time, to the challenges Israel and Jews face and to thank Americans on both sides of the aisle for their support. Of course, some reference to his own responsibility for October 7 would have been nice, but humility is not a trait that any politician specializes in. However, I caution you, do not infer from what I said what my opinion is regarding whether Netanyahu should resign or not. On the other hand, President Biden spoke movingly about his passing of the torch, his sense of service, and his concerns and optimism for America’s future. But he too took no responsibility for his delayed decision nor delved deeply into the impediments of age. However, I again caution you, do not infer from what I said what my opinion is regarding whether Biden should have stepped down or who I support for President.
However, I think both speeches will be remembered well by history even though some will remain detractors. And whether you agree with one, both, or neither—I propose that we all start thinking first about the messages our leaders and their competitors express, and then about the messenger. The future of our democracy, and Israel’s, depends on not just reflexively reacting to who is doing the saying without independently considering what they are saying and whether you believe it. Frankly, we need the politics of vilification (which I have been guilty of too) to end, especially when vilification is based on personality, conjecture and agendas not facts and actions.
Therefore, I suggest we all think about applying a simple test—if somebody that more represents your own viewpoint or political persuasion had delivered the gist of what either Biden or Netanyahu had said in those speeches would your analysis of their message and motives, be different? No matter how unlikely, if Benny Gantz had said what Bibi Netanyahu did, would your reaction be different? Similarly, no matter how unlikely, if Donald Trump had said what Joe Biden did would your reaction be different?
In these difficult times, I’m going to try to listen to the message independent of what I think of the messenger and only then form my conclusions by considering first message and then messenger.
Also, if you have an interest in the danger Hezbollah presents and how it came to be, you might consider purchasing my book which can be obtained on Amazon here.
Weekend Update July 25-28, 2024, 02:00 pm – Northern Arena—Written by Dana Polak for the Alma Research and Education Center—July 28, 2024
Hezbollah: A Direct Hit by an Iranian Falaq-1 Rocket on a Soccer Field in Majdal Shams in Israel—Written by Dana Polak and Tal Beeri for the Alma Research and Education Center—July 28, 2024
The Terrifying Lebanon Scenarios—Written by Jonathan Schanzer for Commentary—July 27, 2024
Is America Too Busy to Pay Attention to the Middle East? With special guest Clifford Sobin—During this interview on July 22, Yaakov Lappin and I discussed many issues ranging from Northern Israel to the Houthis to Netanyahu’s, at that time, upcoming visit to the United States.
On another note, I urge you to consider becoming a member of Lappin’s Patreon site. He is a military analyst who frequently appears on I24 News, is well-sourced, and gets interesting guests for interviews.
The Unbreakable Bonds: Stories of Resilience from Israel's Embattled North—Written by Nathan J. Minsberg for Israel Hayom—July 23, 2024
Palestinian Authority Recognition Makes 899 Gazans Eligible for Pay-for-Slay—Written by Tamar Marcus and Ephraim D. Tepler for Palestinian Media Watch—July 23, 2024—It’s these little things that the general public does not know—terrorists captured in Gaza by Israel are eligible to be paid by the Palestinian Authority for their perfidy.
Wikipedia’s Jewish Problem—Written by Izabella Tabarovsky for Tablet—July 24, 2024—This is an incredibly important read, what I learned didn’t shock me, but it certainly surprised me.
Is UNIFIL Doomed? Not If It Is Significantly Reconfigured—Written by Alma Research—July 23, 2024
“I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind” —Palestinian Armed Groups’ October 7 Assault on Israel—A comprehensive report written by Human Rights Watch regarding October 7
'Dismantling Hamas from Within': IDF Uncovers Trove of Hamas Secrets—Written by Amir Bohbat for the Jerusalem Post—July 21, 2024
War in the North, the Defense Budget, and Strategy—Written by By Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies—July 21, 2024 - I disagree with the author’s conclusions regarding timing because he fails to consider what the enemy will do in the interim period before Israel confronts Hezbollah, fails to consider the changing political landscape, and calls for a singular focus on building up for a decisive war with Hezbollah that I think unlikely to be initiated or sustained. Nevertheless, I link to it so that you can reach your own conclusions.
'If Israel Falls, the West Falls': Geert Wilders is Europe's Last Stand Against Islam - Opinion—Memy Peer for the Jerusalem Post—July 3, 2024
IDF Jets Target Houthi Regime in Strike on Hodeidah Energy Infrastructure—Written by Yonah Jeremy Bob and others for the Jerusalem Post—July 20, 2024
20 Fighter Jets, 1,000 Miles Away: This is How Israel Hit the Houthis in Yemen—Written by Lilach Shoval for Israel Hayom—July 21, 2024
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
This is a very important analysis. I was surprised to see such in-depth writing on the topic that became so much more critical after the tragic Majdal Shams missile attack and then not surprised to learn in the reading that you began this article before that attack. So here are my questions:
1. How much do you think Majdal Shams changes the equation? Maybe we'll even get an answer from the news before you respond to me here because I feel the waiting for the inevitable war is so stressful. I don't know how the country will react (and how the Druze will react) if the decision is made to go the diplomatic route before the Druze get their revenge.
2. If the Falaq-1 rocket is not a guided missile, then was this an "accident?" In other words, was Hezbollah aiming for a military base in the region and it fell short or sideways or whatever?