Iran's Nuclear Program-What Now and What Was Achieved
June 29, 2025 - Issue #80
Too much of the ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of Operation Midnight Hammer, America’s attack on three Iranian nuclear sites, consists of people of different political persuasions talking at each other rather than with each other. Because they use ill-defined terms, coupled with phrases that inflame rather than illuminate, confusion reigns—distracting us from challenges that lie ahead.
I hope to rectify that, here, by explaining what the pundits and political operatives do not.
For those of you willing to read further, you will:
Gain a basic understanding of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program before Israel struck Iran on June 13.
Discover what Israel’s attack accomplished.
Appreciate the importance of America’s Operation Midnight Hammer.
Learn two things can be true at the same time regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
Come to realize that the ceasefire now in place is a beginning not an end.
What Was Iran’s Plan for Making a Nuclear Weapon?
Nuclear weapons come in two basic forms:
A nuclear warhead deliverable by a missile or a plane; or
A crude device that could be transported, for example, in the back of a truck or on a boat.
You may also have heard references to a “dirty bomb.” A dirty bomb is not a nuclear device. Instead, it is a device composed of regular explosives and radioactive materials. When it explodes, it spreads radioactive material around a small area rendering the contaminated areas dangerous to use, and expensive and difficult to clear. But with a dirty bomb there is no nuclear blast. Instead, the blast area is relatively confined—its breadth dependent on the quantity of non-nuclear explosives used.
To build a nuclear warhead, the uranium used must be enriched to 90%. To build a crude device, only 60% enriched uranium is needed. However, to build either a nuclear warhead or a crude device, the enriched 90%, or even just the 60% uranium for a crude device, must then be converted into specialized metallic components (for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to that as “metal” below). Thus, just possessing 90% or even 60% enriched uranium is not enough (in theory a crude device does not require metal, but going down that path is extremely difficult and probably has never been attempted). There are other technical pre-requisites too, such as testing and fashioning warhead components, but I will not further complicate this essay by delving into those arcane issues.
So, how did Iran plan to build its nuclear weapon?
It starts with yellowcake. Yellowcake is processed uranium ore. Iran gets uranium ore from its domestic mining operations. That ore is mostly composed of uranium 238 (U-238) which is not useful for making nuclear weapons. But a little less than one percent of that ore is uranium 235 (U-235). And U-235 is what is needed to build a nuclear weapon. But there is a catch. The U-235 must be concentrated to create the chain reaction needed for a nuclear explosion. Iran’s plan was to get rid of the U-238 in the uranium ore, thereby creating a concentration of U-235. Concentrate it enough and Iran would have the makings of a nuclear bomb. But that process is not easy. The first step is to convert unconcentrated (unrefined) uranium ore into yellowcake, which is a powdery substance. Then, the march to a nuclear weapon can begin.
Isfahan
At Isfahan, Iran had a plant that turned yellowcake made elsewhere into uranium hexafluoride, a gaseous substance suitable for enrichment in centrifuges.
Enrichment for our purposes means concentrating the amount of U-235 in a substance that can be used in a nuclear bomb by getting rid of the U-238. To accomplish that, Iran put the hexafluoride gas into centrifuges. Centrifuges separate the lighter U-235 from the heavier U-238 by spinning at a fast rate. Due to the spinning, the U-238 in the gas will tend to move towards the outer wall of the centrifuge and the U-235 will tend to concentrate in the center. But the process is laborious, repetitive and time consuming. To accomplish the first step of the enrichment process, Iran built an underground plant at Natanz.
To Natanz, Iran shipped the gaseous uranium hexafluoride made at Isfahan in order to perform the first step of the enrichment process. Later, Iran built an experimental above ground small scale pilot program at Isfahan capable, in a first step of enrichment, of enriching all the way to 20% which was far more than the centrifuges at Natanz were capable of. Success there would have allowed Iran to perhaps bypass the Natanz step or to upgrade Natanz with the technology at the pilot plant. In addition, Iran established other above-ground sites at Isfahan used for working on other technical issues necessary for building a nuclear weapon.
Subsequently, Iran established an extremely deep underground site at Isfahan where it stored (or still stores) 400kg (880 pounds) of 60% enriched uranium processed at Fordow (more on this below).
Thus, Isfahan was:
Where the enrichment process began, turning uranium ore into a gaseous substance.
Where Iran experimented with creating a faster first step enrichment process.
Where at above ground locations, Iran went forward with other activity crucial for the nuclearization project.
Where Iran stored highly enriched uranium.
Natanz
At Natanz, Iran created a huge underground center that contained at least 15,000 centrifuges. Here, in centrifuges spinning away night and day, massive quantities of uranium hexafluoride gas delivered from Isfahan was enriched to a 4.5% concentration. The amount enriched was far more than required by any conceivable civilian program. And, important to know, the hardest, most laborious stage of enrichment was done at Natanz. Getting uranium hexafluoride gas to the 4.5% enrichment level is about seven-tenths of the effort required to get to 90% enrichment. In other words, the process to get to weapons grade uranium is not a straight-line effort—the toughest going is at the beginning.
But 4.5% was just the beginning. It was nowhere near the end of the process. And this is where the plot thickened. Iran then transported this 4.5% enriched uranium to Fordow.
Fordow
Fordow is where the devil’s work escalated. Here, Iran concentrated more advanced centrifuges which enriched the Natanz processed 4.5% uranium to 20% (remember, at Isfahan there was a pilot program to go all the way to 20% in a first step). Mind you, enrichment requirements for civilian programs are 3% to 5%. The 20% enriched uranium was four times the maximum level needed and permitted under international law for civilian programs. And, even more worrisome, Iran further enriched some of the 20% uranium gas to 60%.
Then, in December of 2024, Iran made a fateful decision. It took the Fordow 20% enriched uranium gas, probably coupled with the 20% uranium gas from the small pilot program at Isfahan, and started a breakout by using the Fordow centrifuges to enrich all of it to 60%—ultimately getting to at least 880 pounds (400 kg) of 60% enriched uranium. From there, Fordow had the capacity to further enrich from 60% to 90% . Also important to know, whereas most of the enrichment effort is in moving from yellowcake to 4.5%, and considerable effort is required to go from 4.5% to 60%, moving from 60% to 90% enrichment (the last stage of enrichment) requires only one hundredth of the effort required for enrichment from beginning to end. That means, going from 60% to 90% can be done quickly. That is why some estimated that whenever it wanted to, Iran could make enough 90% enriched uranium for one bomb in only a few days and nine bombs within a month!
Metalizing the Uranium
Fortunately, there is another step after enrichment. Enriched uranium must be metalized before it can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon. This is the case whether the intent is to create a crude bomb with 60% enriched uranium or a warhead with 90% enriched uranium. This can take some time, perhaps weeks or months. Most, if not all the facilities to do that were above ground at Isfahan.
What About the 880 pounds of 60% Enriched Uranium that Iran Made?
Through calculations that are beyond me, the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) determined that prior to Israel initiating strikes on Iran on June 13, 2025, Iran had already made 880 pounds of 60% enriched uranium. A week before Israel struck, IAEA inspectors saw the 880 pounds at underground storage facilities at Isfahan where they were kept in small casks that in total could fit into the trunks of ten cars. The IAEA has not seen the 880 pounds since and has no idea of its present whereabouts.
Reports of trucks at the Fordow site have led to suggestions that some enriched uranium at that location may have been moved from that site in the days leading up to the US attack. Others pontificate that perhaps Iran moved the enriched uranium seen by the IAEA at Isfahan to Fordow to safeguard it from Israeli attack—not realizing that an American strike on Fordow would soon be forthcoming. Some have put forward an alternative theory, suggesting Iran used the trucks at Fordow to move a small amount of the centrifuges there to somewhere else, or that Iran used the trucks to bring in concrete to block entrances at Fordow to protect the site from attack by ground forces or by air, etc. Frankly, at least from information presently publicly available, there is no way to know.
Israel’s Achievements from June 13-24
Israel’s goals were twofold:
Setback Iran’s nuclear program significantly.
Setback Iran’s ballistic missile program significantly.
Israel achieved both goals.
Regarding ballistic missiles, Iran had embarked on a crash program to increase its inventory of missiles capable of reaching Israel (and Europe) from 2,500 pre-war (perhaps 1,250 post twelve-day war) to almost 9,000 within two years. With those missiles in place, Israel’s anti-ballistic missile defense systems would not have been able to stop barrages of Iranian missiles from levelling countless city blocks and killing thousands. Now, Israel has successfully destroyed much of Iran’s recently crafted 300 missile per month manufacturing capability, ending Iranian dreams of flooding the battlefield with death winging down from above. In addition, Israel has also whittled down the number of missile launchers Iran possesses to an estimated 100—thus reducing the number of missiles that Iran can fire in any one barrage.
Israel has also destroyed Iran’s solid fuel production capability. This is important because liquid fuel must be loaded into a missile before firing—a process that takes hours and that can be detected. This opens the door to destroying the missiles before they can be launched and makes it easier to intercept them afterwards because of the ease of detecting preparations for launch. Solid fuel eliminates that delay. Using solid fuel, missiles can be launched quickly thereby preventing them from being destroyed before launch.
Highlights of Israel’s Destruction of Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Significantly damaged or destroyed some or many of the centrifuges at Natanz.
Destroyed the electrical plants necessary for operation of the centrifuges at Natanz.
Destroyed much or all of Iran’s capability to make new centrifuges.
Destroyed Iran’s plants for converting enriched uranium to metal at Isfahan.
Destroyed the pilot 20% enrichment uranium factory at Isfahan.
Destroyed at Arak a heavy water plant which Iran could have otherwise used to restart its nuclear weapon program.
Destroyed a headquarters building used by an Iranian entity called SPND to do nuclear warhead weaponization work.
Destroyed sites at Isfahan where Iran conducted nuclear weaponization work.
Destroyed other above ground buildings at various other sites where nuclear weapon development work was being done, including at Natanz.
Impacted the underground area where the 400kg of 60% enriched uranium may have been stored at Isfahan. That may have destroyed, buried, or otherwise impeded Iranian ability to access it through cave ins and the like.
Killed 11 to 14 of Iran’s top nuclear scientists.
America’s Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities—Operation Midnight Hammer
At about 6:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on June 21, seven B-2 American bombers entered Iranian airspace after an eighteen-hour flight from their base in the United States. About twenty minutes later, six B-2s dropped twelve massive ordnance penetrators (MOPS) on Iran’s nuclear site deeply buried site at Fordow. The seventh B-2 dropped two MOPS onto Iran’s underground nuclear site at Natanz. MOPs are massive 30,000-pound bombs specially designed to penetrate deeply buried underground facilities like the ones Iran uses to protect its nuclear weapon program. Only the United States has such weapons and only heavy bombers like what the United States possesses has the capability to deliver them. Israel possesses neither the weapons nor the delivery capability.
In addition, America fired about thirty tomahawk missiles from a submarine that destroyed nuclear program targets at Isfahan, including ore to uranium hexafluoride conversion facilities.
At Fordow, it appears that the MOPS were aimed at ventilation shafts identified as weak points. Overlaying the holes created by the MOPs over known schematics of Fordow (stolen from Iran by Israel in 2018) confirms that the MOPS struck the facility’s weakest point. However, it is unknown at present if the MOPS caved in the structures at Fordow and Natanz. But what is certain is that the explosive impact of the MOPS caused significant vibrations within the sites and centrifuges are particularly sensitive to even the slightest vibrations. They also can be profoundly impacted by electrical fluctuations caused by destruction of the aboveground electric power sites which both Israel and American efforts succeeded in doing. Therefore, it is a virtual certainty that at the minimum, many of the centrifuges inside Natanz and Fordow are no longer operable and for at least the short term, not accessible. More likely, especially at Natanz, and possibly at Fordow, the underground chambers sustained massive damage as well.
As such, America delivered a devastating blow that, in combination with Israel’s efforts, delivered an immense setback for Iran’s nuclear weapons program that includes the destruction of many thousands of centrifuges and Iran’s ability to build more.
What Now?
Since June 24, after a troubling start that I blame Iran for during its first few hours, Iran and Israel have honored the ceasefire. Unfortunately, the end of the fighting signified by the now peaceful skies over Iran and Israel has brought on a communication war due to a relentless onslaught of punditry and political messaging. In essence, this new war of words being fought in the media and through the mouths of politicians and their spokespersons is primarily about:
Whether Iran’s nuclear program was “obliterated” versus setback several months.
Where the 880 lbs. of 60% uranium is located.
How long will it now take Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon?
Did Iran’s leader give the order to build a nuclear weapon?
All of this is nonsense. The hogwash we are being fed is designed to promote political agendas—either for or against the current American administration, not secure Israel or find a realistic path to peace for the region that does not involve Israel’s abdication of its legitimate security needs.
Here is what is important:
Iran’s nuclear weapon program can be thought of like an assembly line. To get to the finish line, Iran not only has to begin at the starting point, but it also must sequentially accomplish multiple steps along the way. Fail to fulfil one or more of those steps, then no bomb. To put it another way, think of a baseball game. To score a nuclear run, Iran must start by:
a. Hitting the ball (mine the uranium ore),
b. Run to first base (make the ore into yellowcake and uranium hexafluoride),
c. Run to second base (enrich the uranium hexafluoride to 4.5% uranium then 20% then 60% then 90%),
d. Run to third base (make the enriched uranium into metal), and
e. Run to home plate while on the way doing the other things necessary to complete the weapon including finding a means to shape it and put it on a warhead.
Every one of these steps, whether you apply the assembly line or the baseball analogy, has been taken out of Iran’s present capability. Now, it can’t make yellowcake or uranium hexafluoride, it can’t enrich present stocks of Uranium further (except perhaps with some small quantities of hidden centrifuges), it can’t make any enriched uranium it retains into the metal it needs, and it can’t perform the other tasks necessary to build a nuclear bomb because it no longer has the infrastructure to do so. Furthermore, rectifying these roadblocks has been made more difficult for Iran because it has lost its leading scientists trained to further nuclear weaponization. Over time, can they be replaced? Sure. But it will take time, and I wonder how many scientists will be eager to get involved given the fate of their predecessors.
Our lack of knowledge regarding the location of the 880 lbs. of 60% enriched uranium is concerning, but not unduly so. Perhaps it is buried out of reach of the Iranians for the time being, perhaps it was destroyed in the attacks on Isfahan or Fordow, and perhaps the Iranians have hidden some or all of it. But, as I explained above, even if Iran still possesses that amount of enriched uranium, it needs to do much more to make a nuclear weapon. That is where coercive diplomacy and military force comes into the picture.
Frankly, I don’t listen to estimates of how long Iran’s nuclear program has been set back because what matters is that Iran cannot build a nuclear weapon now and that to do so it needs to replace what has been destroyed. Replacement might take months, it might take years—all dependent on the resources Iran possesses, the willingness of outside powers to assist Iran, and whether Israel and/or the United States will allow it. Therefore, it is prevention that matters now, not guesstimates.
I could care less whether Iran’s Supreme Leader gave the order to build a nuclear weapon because clearly, he gave the order to prepare to build one. Otherwise, there would have been no reason for Iran to spend many billions whose only purpose is to build a nuclear weapon and no reason to accept the economic hardships imposed on Iran by its refusal to stop its nuclear weapon program. Then, when Iran would have completed everything necessary to conduct the final assembly of a nuclear weapon, the Supreme Leader could have, and most likely would have given his professed desire to destroy Israel and the value having a nuclear weapon would have for fulfilling that goal, given the order to build it. Then, should Israel and the United States have delayed striking Iran’s nuclear weapon program until the moment the Supreme Leader ordered assembly of a nuclear weapon, even if discovered immediately by western intelligence agencies, there would not have been any time to do anything about it. So two things can be true at once and are really the same—a) the Supreme Leader wanted to build a nuclear weapon and ordered the necessary preparations to do so but b) had not yet ordered construction of the weapon because there was no need to do so until Iran could do it quickly.
Furthermore, one thing has not changed. Iran still wants to destroy Israel. On June 26, 2017, Iran unveiled its doomsday clock in Tehran’s central Palestine Square that displayed an 8,411-day countdown towards when Ayatollah Khamenei thought Israel would be destroyed in 2045. Every day the digits on the clock would change in a visual reminder that Israel’s day of doom was drawing nearer. But on June 23, that clock stopped ticking when an Israeli missile fired from an American manufactured jet destroyed it.
Now, it is the task of Israelis, Americans, and citizens of the world alike to ensure that the ghost of that clock does not reemerge. In furtherance of that, the ceasefire now in effect is meaningless. It is what comes next that matters.
Now, not later, negotiators must insist that:
Iran must permit IAEA inspectors full access to Iran’s nuclear sites (something Iran has already said no to in the last couple days);
Iran must permit ongoing robust IAEA inspections in the future;
Iran must explain what those trucks outside Fordow were doing;
Iran must state where the 880 lbs. of 60% uranium material is now located, permit access to it, and permit its removal from Iran;
Iran must agree to end its nuclear weapon program and dismantle all undestroyed infrastructure that furthers that cause;
Iran must turn over for removal from the country all enriched uranium in its possession other than a small amount of 3-5% uranium that can be used under watchful international eyes for civilian purposes;
Iran must disclose all its infrastructure built for the purpose of its nuclear weapon program;
Iran must not pull out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty it long ago signed;
Iran must not rebuild its ballistic missile construction capability; and
Iran must pledge to end its support of terror organizations worldwide.
Only by securing Iran’s agreement and compliance regarding the above ten demands, should sanctions targeting Iran end. And until Iran agrees, Israel must maintain the right to to fly reconnaissance over Iran and when necessary, take military action to stop Iran from restarting any of its nuclear or ballistic missile programs or to rebuild its air defenses. Otherwise, all that has been gained will be lost.
So, don’t listen to what the pundits and politicians say about the past. Instead, articulate and demand what must be done now.
A Special Request
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Can Israel End Iran’s Nuclear Program?—Written by Armin Rosen for Tablet—June 17, 2025 (This is a fascinating interview of David Albright—an acknowledged expert on the subject).
Iranian and Iranian-Backed Attacks Against Americans (1979-Present)—Written by Tzvi Kahn for The Foundation for Defense of Democracies—June 19, 2025
Israeli Secret Services ‘Used Fake Phone Call’ to Lure Iran’s Air Force Elite to Their Deaths—Written by a Jewish Chronicle reporter for the Jewish Chronicle—June 17, 2025
Why Israel Had No Choice Tehran Endangers the Whole Middle East—Written by Edward Luttwak for Unherd—June 13, 2025
How IDF Intelligence Outmaneuvered Iran - Explainer—Written by Yonah Jeremy Rob for the Jerusalem Post—June 17, 2025
Bombs Rain Down—and a Divided Israel Unites Behind the War—Written by Matti Friedman for the Free Press—June 15, 2025
How Textbooks and Children’s Shows in America Became Hamasified—Written by Seth Mandel for Commentary—May 23, 2025
Why Anti-Semitism Is Getting Younger—Written by Seth Mandel for Commentary—February 12, 2025
The War Against the War Against the Jews—Written by Daniella Pletka for Commentary—July/August 2025 edition.
Journalists for Genocide—Written by Melanie Phillips for her Newsletter—June 8, 2025
How the Muslim Brotherhood Is Capturing Europe—Written by Simone Rodan-Benzaquen for the Free Press—June 2, 2025
Galilee Security Mavens Warn Turkey Replacing Iran—Written by Canaan Lidor for Jewish News Syndicate—May 29, 2025
A Conversation with Syrian Leader: Journey Beyond the Ruins—Written by Jonathan Bass for Jewish Journal—May 28, 2025
US Victims Can Sue Palestinian Terrorists, Supreme Court Rules Unanimously—Written by Vita Fellig for Jewish News Syndicate—June 20, 2025
GHF Updates on Aid Distribution Success, Debunks Hamas Propaganda—Written by the Jerusalem Post Staff for the Jerusalem Post—June 2, 2025
Who Profits from Gaza’s Desperation?—Written by Eli Lake for the Free Press—June 3, 2025
Washington Post Retracts Gaza Aid Report, Says it Failed to Meet 'Fairness Standards'—Written by the Jerusalem Post Staff for the Jerusalem Post—June 4, 2025
J’Accuse—Written by Michael Oren for Clarity—June 3, 2025
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
For the first time, I understand the terms being bandied about on TV and in the written news outlets. I now more clearly understand the implications of what Israel and the USA did during the 12-day-war. This article should be required reading.
https://reeceashdown.substack.com/p/iran-at-the-edge-of-the-atom?r=5qrbeg