Day 51 - The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning? My Assessment.
November 26, 2023 - Issue #33
What is the status of the war now?
It’s on pause.
Or is it?
Yes, the fighting in Gaza has stopped for the moment. But the information war is in full swing. Every hostage release has come with Hamas manipulated video that tries to suggest how humanely the hostages were treated and how appreciative they are. Seriously?
And on Sunday, Hamas cynically played with the emotions of Israelis by manufacturing impediments to the hostage release process. Predictably, media accounts refused to assess blame. But actions speak louder than words. Qatari and Egyptian mediators descended on the Rafah Crossing to pressure Hamas. President Biden spoke with the Qatari Emir. Finally, the log jam broke and the second batch of hostages were released. Today, Hamas released more hostages. Presumably, Monday’s release will go through as well.
What will come next? More hostage releases or more war. Israel demands both—freedom for all the hostages and the elimination of Hamas. Hamas wants neither—but it is willing to dribble out hostages in order to put off its inevitable demise at the hands of the IDF.
I suspect that the pause might last more than four days—until Hamas’ ability or willingness to give up more women, children, and elderly ends or the price it demands for their release, or for the release of the men and soldiers it holds, will be too high for Israel to bear. Already today, Hamas has asked for an extension of the pause—likely due to its desperation and desire to champion its cause—but certainly not from an onset of humanitarianism in their hearts.
We might also see stops and starts in the war because Israel will not pause for more negotiations unless there is a steady flow of hostages coming home. Rather, Israel will prefer to only negotiate again with Hamas under fire. And eventually, despite international pressure, I hope Israel will put an end to Hamas because as Yaakov Lappin said on I24 News, the “continuity of the country” demands it.
Meanwhile, most Israelis are satisfied with the pace of operations in Gaza. Recognizing that Hamas had planned its defenses based on the IDF rushing into Gaza after the events of October 7, the IDF took a much more methodical approach. Rather than rush, the IDF first trained its reserves then moved into northern Gaza from three directions. That movement encircled Hamas’ forces in northern Gaza. Then IDF soldiers took a deliberate approach that allowed them to detect traps and destroy Hamas positions without incurring massive losses. In a sense, Israel’s patience has been a tactical surprise to Hamas and the United States’ acceptance of Israel’s announced strategy to destroy Hamas, a strategic surprise that gave Israel more time than Hamas anticipated. The results have been phenomenal, at a tragic cost of seventy dead IDF soldiers and many more wounded, the IDF has killed 5,000 Hamas terrorists, wounded many more, and unknown numbers of terrorists have been caught in the rubble of destroyed tunnels and buildings. All told, the IDF has effectively destroyed eleven of twelve Hamas battalions in northern Gaza (each with about 1,000 fighters). Cleaning up the rest of northern Gaza will take another five to seven days of fighting.
To get an idea of what will next happen, last Wednesday I interviewed, on background, four experts regarding the status of the war. Three live in Israel and one in the United States. They all indicated that the war in Gaza was going reasonably well and that there is a broad consensus among Israelis, on the right and the left, that the IDF must finish off Hamas. One said what all thought, that if the job is only half done, that you can “Schedule the next massacre. That is for sure.”
To finish the job, they said, it is inevitable that the will IDF move into southern Gaza, especially into Khan Younis and a few other areas where Hamas is located.
There, the going might be easier as might the ability to better avoid civilian casualties because that part of Gaza is less built-up and only areas like Khan Younis will require civilian evacuation. However, because of the numbers of Gazans that evacuated northern Gaza, trying to avoid civilian casualties without sustaining an inordinate number of IDF casualties will be tricky at best. Once (not “if” I think) Israel resumes its offensive, it will probably take about a month to end the high intensity fighting in the south. After that, it will take several more months of lower-level fighting by smaller forces with access to rid the region of terrorists. Whether Israel will have the time to do that before America (and to some extent opinion worldwide) steps hard enough on the brakes to stop the IDF will depend, in some part, on two things:
The number of Gazan non-combatant casualties (a byproduct of Hamas hiding behind them) versus the determination of Israelis to finish the job of eliminating a savage enemy on their border; and
How well Hamas plays the hostage game versus Israeli ability to avoid falling into Hamas’ trap of hope and heart that diminishes its now resolute resolve that the nation’s future is at stake if it allows inordinate delay to prevent it from destroying Hamas.
But at least with Gaza there is a roadmap, as potholed as it might be. In northern Israel, there is a nightmare that the world has not yet woken up to. It is a nightmare that many Israelis still hope will just be a bad dream rather than a reality. For far too long this nightmare has been kicked down the road. But now, no longer. The seeds of confrontation have germinated. And even though a war far more devastating than the one now in Gaza might be just around the corner it is not on many people’s radar screen.
But I will speak of it.
And so will those in the north.
And so did all four experts I spoke with. Unanimously, they were of the opinion that the status quo in the north is not acceptable. There, Hezbollah has gradually escalated from one or two attacks on Israel per day, to four, and then ten or more. Where once there were “Rules of the Game,” honored for the most part by Hezbollah, which restricted Hezbollah from:
attacking the IDF inside Israel other than in disputed territory such as Shebaa Farms; or
attacking Israeli civilians,
Hezbollah is now doing so—striking IDF bases and civilians alike. So much so that Israel had to evacuate 60,000 people within three miles of the border. Those people now live in temporary facilities, such as hotels. Their children’s schooling has been interrupted, and all movement and commerce along the border stopped. Further back, Israelis live in fear of Hezbollah’s missiles and ground force incursions. This is not sustainable. It is a loss of territory and livelihood at the hands of a terrorist entity allied with Iran that thirsts for more. Israel cannot accept that. No country would. Nor is there any indication, other than during the pause now in effect, that Hezbollah’s attacks will end.
And it gets worse.
All four experts were clear, not only is the present situation in the north not acceptable, also, a return to the status quo before October 7 is not acceptable. Meaning the shooting stops.
Why?
Because Hezbollah is ten times stronger than Hamas. Because much of the terrain along Israel’s border with Lebanon is heavy brush that provides cover or contains urban areas that butt up against Israeli ones. And because what Hamas did on October 7 is straight from Hezbollah’s playbook. That is why Hezbollah built the six tunnels the IDF discovered in 2019 that penetrated into Israel from Lebanon (there easily could be more that have not been discovered). That is why Hezbollah has created and trained the Radwan force, a several thousand strong unit whose purpose is to cross the border and penetrate into Israel’s nearby towns and settlements to do exactly what Hamas did.
Having watched with horror the unfolding events of October 7, few Israelis will bring their wives, children, and elderly family members back to their homes on the border where they would face on a daily basis the same thing those along Gaza’s border experienced.
Nonsense, you might think. Build into place better security measures. Unfortunately, that sounds good, but it is not realistic. There are always ways around what appears to be the most airtight security. Walls and technology, as was proven on October 7, are not foolproof. And the border with Lebanon is too long and too rugged to have soldiers man every yard of it or even just keep a watchful eye backed up with enough power to immediately stop a sudden, massive incursion.
And then there is the issue of tension. As one of the experts I spoke with explained to me, during war there is a certain combat tension, that translates to watchfulness. But that dissipates over time, especially over years. Procedures get ignored and norms produce rigid thinking. Eventually then, complacency becomes pervasive. That rule of human nature combined with ingenuity is what Hamas took advantage of. So will Hezbollah because it, like Hamas, want to destroy Israel. Words matter. So does capability. Thus, if Hezbollah remains in place, it will likely wait for the right combination of moment and technique to strike a blow far worse than the tragedy of October 7. Would you take a chance that it has a more benign intent if you had a home on the border?
So what to do about the security challenge in the north? Especially because Israel cannot afford to keep its reserve soldiers mobilized for years—ready to fight a war with Hezbollah at a moments’ notice. One report I saw estimated that the present war is costing Israel 260 Million dollars a day, or about eight billion dollars per month. For comparison purposes, America’s GDP is about fifty times that of Israel’s. Imagine if the United States had to fight a war that cost fifty times eight billion (400 billion) a month for years! Meanwhile, Israel’s tax revenues will be down as long as fighting continues as will its gross domestic product with tourism non-existent and industrial production severely impaired by loss of manpower and other factors. Therefore, while speed might not be of the essence, it is important. Otherwise, Israel will be broke.
I see only two options. Either of which must be done quickly before Israel’s economy spirals into ruin. The first, is to convince the United Nations to put teeth into Resolution 1701 which mandated that UNIFIL, the UN designated peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, patrol southern Lebanon in conjunction with the Lebanese Army to ensure no other armed force exists there (meaning Hezbollah). However, that has been the plan for the forty-five years UNIFIL has been in its neutered existence. For all those years, the United Nations failed to ensure that UNIFIL would aggressively do so. Instead, rather than demilitarizing southern Lebanon, UNIFIL has allowed Hezbollah to create a fortress there teeming with manpower armed to the teeth and missiles ready to fire at Israel at a moments notice. Not once during those years and among those tens of thousands of missiles, tens of miles of defensive tunnels and offensive fortifications, and tens of thousands of armed soldiers has UNIFIL stopped Hezbollah from turning southern Lebanon into Hezbollah’s base for operations against Israel. Nor is it likely that the United Nations would require UNIFIL to use force to turnback Hezbollah now. That would require a commitment of a huge international army willing to take significant casualties that would take months or years to out together. Few nations, if any, would be willing to join such a crusade. Thus, for Israel to rely on a sudden change of heart by the United Nations, in the face of forty-five years of failure and the high cost in treasure and lives of reversing what Hezbollah has achieved in the interim would be worse than a false hope—due to the inaction that would invite, it would be a recipe for disaster on a level many times that of October 7.
That leaves the second option—forcing Hezbollah back to the other side of the Litani River by negotiation or war. This eighteen-mile pullback would create sufficient space to prevent Hezbollah from launching a surprise attack that could penetrate into Israel. It also would move many of Hezbollah’s missiles out of range of most, if not all, of Israel.
Negotiations would be one way of trying to accomplish Hezbollah’s withdrawal. But it is doubtful those negotiations would succeed unless Hezbollah believes that Israel is willing to attack coupled with Hezbollah deciding it is not willing to bear the cost of that attack (a doubtful proposition since many believe that for political reasons Hezbollah is itching for a fight started by pinprick attacks by Israel). However, should Israel try negotiation, there must be a time limit backed by a believable threat, such as sixty days. Otherwise, Hezbollah will just play out the talks for years until it can attack at a moment of its choosing. That wait would be both too dangerous and too expensive.
Or, Israel might try roll Hezbollah back by taking kinetic action. Probably a pre-emptive attack. Maybe with airpower and artillery alone, but likely with a long-lasting ground incursion as well that would recreate the security zone present from 1985-2000.
At present, both sides have the capability to strike a devastating first blow. However, only one side—Hezbollah—has the capability to wait out the other while maintaining the status quo. Israel, however, likely has the ability to destroy much of Hezbollah’s longer-range missiles with a lightening attack. With the IDF now present in force along the border and citizens evacuated, now is probably the best opportunity the IDF will ever have to successfully pre-empt. Although other options might exist, like a declared free-fire zone in southern Lebanon, none of them are likely to come free of retribution and all of them will be costly, come with world approbation long-term, and invite the pre-emptive attack from Hezbollah that Israel hopes to avoid.
For now, however, Israel appears content using its firepower to kill Hezbollah operatives that present a danger and destroy, as Defense Minister Gallant said, “Dozens of observations posts, warehouses, bunkers, and headquarters.” Gallant said that has caused Hezbollah to retreat from the “front sector, backward into the depth of the territory.” How far, he did not say. I suspect we are talking yards not miles. Open ground not towns.
Soon, I think, things will change for the worse. But even if everything remains the same, many Israeli citizens will not return to their homes on the border. Call me pessimistic.
I hate beating the drums for war, but I see no alternative to dealing with the problem of Hezbollah now. Later Hezbollah will be stronger, Israel will be weaker because of demobilization, Israel’s moral will suffer because of the aftershocks of October 7 and the loss of use of its northern border region, and Iran will likely have nuclear weapons. All of this is a recipe for disaster if Israel does not act resolutely now.
I think Israel’s government understands that Israel is on a collision path with Hezbollah but most Israelis may not, and certainly far too many worldwide are not giving it thought. This is the information war that must now be fought in conjunction with the information war regarding Gaza. Because if war breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah it will be too late to explain why after the bullets fly to a far greater degree than today.
Therefore, I wish we were at the beginning of the end, but I think we are at the end of the beginning.
Daily Update: Israel at War Day 46 Nov. 26, 2023, 20:00 PM Israel Time—Written by the Alma Research Staff
Hezbollah increases attacks, IDF degrades Hamas battalions—Written by Seth Frantzman—November 20, 2023
Hezbollah’s Burkan Rocket – From the Battlefields of Syria to Southern Lebanon—Written by Yaakov Lappin for the Alma Center—November 24, 2023—A really scary missile.
The Challenge for Israel: Prevail Against Hamas While Preventing an Iranian Nuclear Breakout—Written by Jacob Nagel and Mark Dubowitz for the Jerusalem Post—November 21, 2023
Pro-Israel Teacher Hides in Queens High School as ‘Radicalized’ Students Riot: ‘They Want Her Fired’—By Susan Edelman and George Worrell for the New York Post—November 25, 2023.
The Road to a Second Kristallnacht—Written by Bret Stephens for Saphir—November 2023
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border