Back to War
December 1, 2023 - Issue #34
Yesterday, I spoke to a friend in Israel while he and his wife were heading south to see their son, who was on a one-day furlough from his IDF unit. Their son serves in Gaza in a combat unit. Yesterday, the pause was still in effect and things were relatively peaceful. Today, he is at war.
The seven-day pause ended at midnight Eastern Standard Time (7:00 a.m. in Israel). Immediately after which, the IDF restarted its offensive. The deal that had been in place was that Hamas would release 10 women or children every day until it had no more, Israel would in return release 30 Palestinian women or children held in custody, and at least 200 trucks would enter Gaza each day with food, fuel, and other humanitarian items for Gaza’s noncombatant population. Israel was open to the pause continuing day-by-day if Hamas continued to fulfill its obligation to release 10 more women or children each day.
The reasons for the end of the pause were two:
1) Hamas failed to give Israel a list of 10 new females or children that it would release the next day as it was required to do by the terms of the agreement; and
2) Hamas launched missiles into Israel around 6:00 a.m. (an hour before the pause was to end).
However, the handwriting was already on the wall. Yesterday, Hamas took credit for two Palestinians that shot and killed three Israelis and wounded five others (another civilian that tried to shoot the terrorists was killed by friendly fire) at a bus stop in Jerusalem. Hamas also had previously attempted to renege on the deal by attempting to replace some of the ten live children or women with the dead bodies of others it had kidnapped. Israel rejected that blatant attempt to rewrite the terms of the pause. Subsequently, Hamas released eight women and children on the last day of the truce and Israel agreed to count two of the twelve released the prior day as having been released for deal purposes with the eight yesterday. Previously, Hamas played games with other aspects of the deal, delaying the list that it was required to provide each day delineating who would be released the following day and not always releasing children with their mothers (although there was initial reporting that the Red Cross would be allowed to meet with the remaining hostages—which it has not—I have not found anything definitive regarding that).
Hamas has said it does not know where all the hostages are. However, given its control over the population, that is a doubtful statement that Israel does not believe (it wouldn’t surprise me if Israel knows where many are), especially since Hamas refuses to give a list of the hostages it does have or have access to. Much more likely is that many hostages have died in Hamas’ hands, or are in poor physical condition due to maltreatment, and/or Hamas wanted to shift from women to releasing men for which it hoped to exact a greater price (either in release of Israeli prisoners or extension of the pause).
In any case, the war is back on and Secretary of State Blinken said today that the fault lies with Hamas. Which takes us to the New York Times article released last night.
The article essentially accuses Israel’s intelligence of having gotten its hands on a Hamas document that it coined “Jericho Wall.” The document details everything that Hamas did on October 7. Then, the New York Times article states, a female Israeli intelligence officer warned in July 2023 that Hamas was training to put in motion the Jericho Wall plan. Her bosses did not agree. How far up the intelligence and military ladder the document and intelligence officer’s report went is not clear yet, although the article suggests high up.
Also, what the article does not state, is whether Prime Minister Netanyahu or any other high-level members of the Israeli government was aware of the document or the intelligence officer’s analysis. That is something that I am sure will be explored in-depth after the war’s conclusion. However, it appears to be something that the media is, and will, have a field day examining and pontificating about in the coming days. It is also going to serve as the basis for political pushback for Israel receiving aid without set conditions. And, inevitably, it will be weaponized by some for political or functional reasons to argue that Netanyahu must leave government now.
And finally, to enter into the theatre of the absurd for a moment, I have heard conjecture of a conspiracy theory which the New York Times article will surely exacerbate. In essence, those nut bags espousing those thoughts think that Israel allowed Hamas to attack and then delayed by many hours any response to give Israel an excuse to go to war (or Netanyahu an excuse to stay in power).
Such nonsense.
Just like accusations that the Jews were in on Al-Qaeda’s plans for 9/11 or that President Roosevelt conspired with others to ignore Japan’s intent to attack Pearl Harbor so that America would have an excuse to enter World War Two. It seems every time there is a disaster there are conspiracy theorists determined to find evil over what is almost always the case—error and/or incompetence.
So, here is what I think:
Netanyahu will one-day in the relatively near future no longer be Prime Minister—most likely after the war is over but possibly before. However, his removal/resignation must be an Israeli process, not one caused or pressured from the outside because it would risk the unity Israel now has to see this nightmare through even though he presently has extremely low approval ratings. American pressure would undercut America’s ability to be an honest broker. Honest brokerage in this instance requires unconditional public political and military support until this crisis ends but does not preclude speaking frankly and honestly in an advisory but non-coercive manner in private. Therefore, I believe it incumbent upon me to stay out of what Israel’s political process should do now. I ask you to consider doing the same. Israelis are the ones whose lives are on the line. At least until the war is over (if not after), let Israelis decide when, if, and how Netanyahu should go.
The failure of intelligence analysis that the New York Times revealed are like America’s failure before 9/11 and Israel’s failure during the days leading up to the Yom Kippur War. Essentially, the Jericho Wall document provided proof of intent and the analyst identified training activities leading toward capability. What was missing, and it does not surprise me, was evidence of a decision to act soon and the likely capacity to do so. That last missing link leads to a pre-existing “concept” receiving too large a weighting versus imaginative but good judgement. Israel had a concept that Hamas was more interested in improving economic conditions in the West Bank than taking aggressive military action. And therefore, far too many in Israel accepted the status quo as supporting their concept. And they were right—until they were wrong. We will come back to the concept of the status quo in a minute.
I suspect that after the war we will learn from investigations much more that will horrify us—as was the case with 9/11 and the Yom Kippur War.
But all this is window dressing for the IDF’s tasks ahead.
Except for one thing—Hezbollah.
Remember, what Hamas did was straight from Hezbollah’s playbook, and it is still a central feature of Hezbollah’s playbook. Hezbollah has:
Publicized its training to take over Israeli villages (see one of many videos here)
Stated its intent to destroy Israel; and
Maintains the capacity to cross into Israel to capture Israeli villages, kill its inhabitants, rape the women there, and carry hostages back to Lebanon.
Hmm. Sounds a lot like what Israeli intelligence learned about Hamas. All that Israel does not have now is certain knowledge of Hezbollah’s decision to act soon (at least I don’t know that the IDF does). But Israel has plenty of knowledge concerning Hezbollah’s intent to do so in the future.
So, that leaves Israel in a quandary as discussed in my last newsletter (Issue #33). Even if things become peaceful again with Hezbollah (today it appears things are headed in the opposite direction), Israeli citizens along the northern border will not accept the status quo (told you I would come back to that concept). They will not accept living within yards of a border held by a hybrid terrorist organization dedicated to killing them, that has the capacity to do so, and is training to do it. The “concept” of Israelis living along the border has changed. So has the “concept” of Israel’s government—I think and hope.
Is a pre-emptive war in the cards? Should it be? What’s the alternative?
What would you do about Hezbollah if you were Israel’s leader?
Israel Sitrep: December 1, 2023
Israeli, US officials discussing expelling Hamas terrorists from Gaza - report—Written by the Jerusalem Post Staff for the Jerusalem Post—November 30, 2023
UN, Women’s Orgs. Ignore Hamas’s Sexual Violence Against Israeli Women—By Judy Siegel-Itzkovich—November 26, 2023
IDF's Spy Unit 504 was Critical in Unmasking Hamas’s Abuse of Hospitals—Written by Jonah Jeremy Bob for the Jerusalem Post—November 20, 2023
Israel's Modern Warfare: How IDF Tech Closes the Loop on Terrorists—Written by Seth J. Frantzman for the Jerusalem Post—November 17, 2023
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border
Another great article, Cliff. Thanks for researching and summarizing....