Just under 9 miles long and a few hundred yards wide, the Philadelphia Corridor could become a flashpoint between Israel, Egypt, and the international community. Named randomly by the IDF decades ago, the Philadelphia Corridor runs west to east along Egypt’s border with southern Gaza. And, on its western side is the city of Rafah, where there is a crossing point between Gaza and Egypt. Other than the Philadelphia Corridor, Hamas cannot easily import weapons of war because to the west is the Mediterranean Sea, and to the north and east is Israel.
Under the Philadelphia Corridor, Bedouin living in the Sinai joined with Palestinians, including Hamas, to construct up to three thousand tunnels through which goods were smuggled, including massive amounts of weaponry and building materials that Hamas uses today against Israel. Above ground, more war material flowed, some due to Egyptians turning a blind eye and some whose journey was greased with cash. In addition, Hamas’ members, and likely others from the outside, used the Rafah crossing point to move freely back-and-forth from Gaza to the rest of the world, facilitating Hamas’ planning, coordination with outside forces, and military training.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Israel feels it necessary to close the corridor. In fact, Prime Minister Netanyahu said three weeks ago that the Philadelphia Corridor “must be in our hands.” Without Israeli control, he made clear, it will be impossible to ensure that Gaza is demilitarized.
However, before I discuss this issue further, a little history is in order.
How Did the Philadelphia Corridor Come to Be?
Israel took control of Gaza and the Sinai during the Six-Day War. Then, in 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty, after which the IDF withdrew from the Sinai, but per the treaty, Israel retained control of Gaza, including the area containing the Philadelphia Corridor. There, the IDF constructed installations and sent patrols to prevent contraband from being smuggled into Gaza from the Sinai. Even after the Oslo accords in 1993, Israel continued to control the corridor.
Then, in 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza after securing Egypt’s agreement to secure the border, thereby preventing armaments from flowing into Gaza. To do so, the two countries agreed that Egypt would maintain a force of 750 soldiers that is “a designated force for the combating of terrorism and infiltration across the border.” At that point, the Palestinian Authority controlled Gaza and there were hopes that many countries would invest in the economic wellbeing of the people living there. However, in 2006, Hamas emerged victorious in Gaza’s local elections although the Palestinian Authority still maintained overall control of Gaza under President Mahmoud Abbas. But in 2007, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority engaged in a battle which ended with Hamas’s operatives throwing Palestinian Authority members off building rooftops after which Hamas took over governance of Gaza.
Since then, Hamas has controlled the Philadelphia Corridor while Egypt has maintained an extremely porous security presence on its side of the border. As a result, during the ensuing eighteen years, military arms and material for building tunnels and rockets have poured through those tunnels. Poured through despite Egypt’s claims that it had destroyed the tunnels—a claim Israeli intelligence vigorously disputes. October 7 proves that Israel was correct. Hamas could neither have armed itself as it did nor built its extensive tunnel network but for what came from Egypt’s Sinai because Israel maintained an effective blockade over sea routes and any items coming to Gaza from the one crossing point in Israel received vigorous inspection.
Common people, however, did not find it so easy to cross from Gaza to Egypt and vise-versa. They could not use the tunnels and Hamas required Gazans to apply several weeks in advance of crossing for permission to do so—permission that was not always granted. The Egyptians, for political and security reasons relating to Egypt’s changing relationship with Hamas, also interfered with the free flow of people and goods moving above ground by frequently closing the crossing point.
October 7 Necessitates a Change
Knowing that Hamas would continue to receive weapons and sustenance through the tunnels under the Philadelphia Corridor, at the beginning of the war the IDF attempted to interdict Hamas’ use of them by dropping bombs on suspected tunnel locations that would crush the passageways. However, because of the multiplicity of tunnels and imperfect intelligence, such a tactic can only slow, but not stop, infiltrations. Especially when civilian presence prevents hitting all targets. A problem now made more complicated by more than one million refugees from other parts of Gaza that now live there in a massive tent city.
Seeking an alternative, Israel’s first attempt at a solution involved asking the Egyptians to move back from the border so that Israeli security personnel could apply a hermetic seal from the Egyptian side. Not surprisingly, the Egyptians refused. All countries, Israel included, get very touchy about losing sovereignty over any of their lands.
Now Israel is considering, and by some reports has decided upon, a military action designed to take back the Philadelphia Corridor (including the Rafah crossing) from the Gaza side. But this comes with many problems. First, Egypt is opposed—arguing that would be a violation of the 1979 peace agreement between the two countries which controls the number of soldiers and type and numbers of military equipment close to Egypt’s border with Israel. While this objection might well be capable of being negotiated, ignored, or finessed, Egypt has another concern. By agreeing to Israel’s presence in the corridor, some might argue that Egypt is agreeing to Israel taking over control of Gaza. Although that might secretly be alright with Egypt’s President Sisi, that is something he might not feel comfortable admitting to Egypt’s citizenry. Nevertheless, Egypt recognizes the problem Israel faces and, in an attempt to alleviate Israel’s concerns and avoid a confrontation, has made noise about building better walls and installing better surveillance equipment (although one report says that Egypt refuses to give to Israel what that surveillance equipment might reveal).
I doubt that Israel will knuckle under to Egypt’s objections. Nor do I think more Egyptian walls and surveillance will do the trick. Because Hamas has been circumventing Egypt’s somewhat reluctant security measures for seventeen years, there is no reason to think that Hamas would not find a way to do so in the future—with or without tacit Egyptian acquiescence. Furthermore, Egypt has no real reason to oppose shutting down the movement of terrorists from and to Gaza, especially because Hamas is aligned with the Moslem Brotherhood which is not a friend to Egypt’s present government. And, if October 7 has taught us anything, walls and surveillance equipment unsupported by sufficient, engaged manpower can be overcome. Therefore, I suspect Egypt and Israel might reach an agreement on a compromise that satisfies Israel’s security needs.
However, Israel does have another problem interfering with its desire to take over the corridor. A desire magnified by the fact that Hamas is still firing missiles at Israel from Rafah. That problem is the more than one million refugees now there. Israel will have to move them or move through them, something that would create an international outcry. But in the end, Israel has no choice. If it is to win the war, and to provide a hopeful future for Gaza’s citizenry, terrorists in Gaza must be left with no opportunity to rearm, resupply, and move freely from and to Gaza. That requires controlling the Philadelphia Corridor. Otherwise, all this since October 7 will have been for naught.
Israel’s critics will cry foul but in the long run, eliminating Hamas and securing the Philadelphia Corridor is one of the most humanitarian things Israel can do for Gazans if they truly are not supportive of terrorists running Gaza.
Barry Goldstein, a friend of mine, created the painting below and the verbiage that accompanies it. Barry’s creation followed a visit we made, together with our wives, to Misgav Am on the Lebanese border. Both of us were emotionally impacted by a young IDF soldier we saw on a lonely patrol there. That Kibbutz has now been hit by many Hezbollah missiles and its population evacuated. I have visited that kibbutz multiple times, always struck by its fragility and vibrance. Yesterday, I received his newsletter highlighting that soldier and his painting of him. I thought it worth you viewing it. Barry now has a Substack newsletter of his own (The Story Behind My Art - check it out) devoted mainly to Judaic and other timely art involving Israel.
I remember feeling small in the presence of the IDF soldiers I spoke with along the circuitous northern border of Israel in 2017 and again in 2019. Not physically small, but small, in relation to their comparatively huge sacrifice and service to Israel, their fellow Israelis and the whole of the Jewish diaspora.
The IDF soldier in this painting was on patrol outside of kibbutz Misgav Am. From this spot, one is surrounded on three sides by Lebanon. An impressive glass observation deck which stood within 50 yards of the soldier in this painting no longer exists. It was destroyed, post October 7, by Hezbollah rocket fire from southern Lebanon.
The Alma Center* estimates that the Iran proxy - Hezbollah, embedded among and beneath the civilian population of southern Lebanon, has ten times the striking capacity as Hamas. In fact Hamas is likened to the Boy Scouts in comparison to the sophistication, savagery and military might of Hezbollah.
Daily update: Israel at war Day 103 – Jan. 17, 2024, 20:00 PM Israel time—Watch the video contained within the article.
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Has Hezbollah Flipped the Equation on Israel?—Written by Yonah Jeremy Bob for the Jerusalem Post—January 16, 2024
The UNRWA are Ensuring the ‘Day After’ Includes More Wars—Written by Jacob Nagel for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies—January 6, 2024.
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War in Gaza is Testing Israel's Economy. A 2nd front against Hezbollah Could Break it—Written by Becky Sullivan for NPR—January 16, 2024.
![This image from video shows a Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile hitting a radar dome at an Israeli Air Force air traffic control base on Mount Meron, January 6, 2024. (Screenshot: Telegram) This image from video shows a Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile hitting a radar dome at an Israeli Air Force air traffic control base on Mount Meron, January 6, 2024. (Screenshot: Telegram)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83dfd1fa-b454-43b7-bc18-6a4959d2389d_640x400.png)
IDF Admits Mount Meron Air Traffic Control Base Damaged in Hezbollah Attack—Written by Emanuel Fabian for TImes of Israel—January 6, 2024
While Gazans Suffer, Hamas Leaders Live in Luxury—Flash Brief for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies—Janaury 13, 2024
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border