Today, January 6, 2024, Hezbollah fired more than forty missiles at targets in northern Israel. Several drones coming from Lebanon and Syria also penetrated Israeli airspace. They are just the latest manifestation of Hezbollah’s new found aggressiveness which has been building for more than a week. So far, Hezbollah’s missiles and UAVs have killed nine Israeli soldiers and four civilians over the last three months. They have also caused much property damage and economic loss in the border region. And, of course, up to eighty thousand Israeli civilians remain evacuated and endure an uncertain future.
All of this crosses Israel’s redlines. Prior to October 7, 2023, Israel would not have tolerated this sustained bombardment. However, because of ongoing operations in Gaza, Israel has been patient, restricting itself to responding to actual and attempted attacks, but doing little else. And although reports are that Hezbollah has lost 143 soldiers (plus 19 terrorists from other groups in Lebanon) to IDF fire, till now Hezbollah has not been deterred.
Nor has Israel done much to challenge Hezbollah further other than with rhetoric.
Until January 2, 2024.
What’s happened?
On January 2, in a building in an area of Beirut tightly controlled by Hezbollah, Saleh al-Arouri plus six other Hamas members were engaged in a meeting that was cut short by up to six missiles, likely fired by a drone. The surgically delivered explosives killed all of them, destroyed the rooms they were in, but did little other damage. Although Israel has not acknowledged responsibility, there is no doubt that Israel did the deed. And, because of what Arouri did during his terrorist career, his death was important—not only to stop his nefarious deeds from continuing, but also as a message to the region that nobody is safe anywhere from Israel’s retribution if they kill Israelis.
But before we go further, I will explain who Saleh al-Arouri was.
Arouri was born in 1966 near Ramallah in the West bank. By 1992, his terrorist activities bought him an eighteen-year prison sentence in an Israeli jail. Released in 2010, he went right back to his deadly work. First, he moved to Jordan, then Syria and Turkey, before, following a short stint in Qatar, he moved to Beirut, Lebanon. Along the way, he was involved in planning numerous terrorist actions in the West Bank that killed dozens of Israelis, including the wanton murder of three innocent hitchhiking Israeli teenagers in 2014 that instigated fighting between Israel and Hamas.
After moving to Lebanon, Arouri’s connection with Hezbollah grew. In 2015, the United States designated Arouri a terrorist and announced up to a five-million-dollar reward for information regarding his whereabouts. In 2017, Arouri received recognition for his efforts against Israel when he was elected deputy head of Hamas. Then, in September 2023, a month before Hamas’ savage attack on October 7, Arouri met in Beirut with members of Hezbollah, Iranian officials, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members after which Arouri called for increased attacks on Israel. I wonder what was discussed at the meeting.
Experts commonly considered Arouri a “visionary” and they tag him with planning responsibility for October 7. His death, like the U.S.’s killing of Iranian General Qassam Soleimani in 2020 and Israel’s killing of a high level Iranian IRGC leader in Syria several days before the death of Arouri, was important. Think of them as tentacles of an octopus. Each tentacle destroyed weakens the present-day capability of the octopus, and for some time to come, even though it might eventually regenerate the lost arm. As such, although Hamas will surely place someone else in his role, Arouri’s capability, experience, and contacts will not be easy to replace quickly, if ever. And, of course, his death furthers Israel’s announced goal of seeking retribution for October 7 against any Hamas leader living outside of Gaza.
Hezbollah’s Response
Nasrallah has spoken publicly twice since Arouri’s death. In essence, he has the chutzpah to accuse Israel of violating Hezbollah’s redlines, ignoring that he blatantly has been doing the same to Israel for the last three months, by reaching into Beirut to kill an ally under Hezbollah’s protection. Thus, Nasrallah contends that Hezbollah must respond to the assassination even though Hezbollah was not targeted. Never mind that for the last three months, Nasrallah has attempted to unilaterally change the “Rules of the Game” by, undertaking according to him 670 operations against Israel in conjunction with allies (Israel says Hezbollah has fired more than 1,000 missiles). In Nasrallah’s mind, after the events of October 7, it is fine for Hezbollah to fire rockets at Israeli soldiers and civilians inside Israel and cause the evacuation of the region and the shutdown of its economy. In return, Nasrallah is apparently willing to tolerate an IDF response if it is confined to places in Lebanon near its border with Israel, but nothing else. But not the killing of one of Hamas’ vital top leaders.
Now, Nasrallah is threatening more. Needing to show strength of a sort, Nasrallah said the following during his speeches on January 3 and 5:
The assassination of Arouri will not go “unanswered or unpunished.”
“The response is undoubtedly coming,” and “We cannot remain silent about a violation of this level because this means that all of Lebanon will be exposed.”
Hezbollah now has an “historic opportunity” to push Israel off the territory Hezbollah claims.
That Israel’s northern residents will be “the first to pay the price if a full-scale war were to erupt.”
“The response is coming. The decision has already been made. The matter now depends on what will unfold on the ground and on Allah,”
Nevertheless, for now, it appears that Nasrallah’s plan may not be to engage in an all-out-war but to carve out a justification to strike a harder blow against Israel. A blow that could come through:
Hezbollah firing clusters of missiles and other weapons into Israel.
Attacks by Iranian proxies from Syria.
Permission for Palestinians to attack Israel from Lebanon.
An attack abroad against Jews or Israelis there.
But Hezbollah could easily chose a different response. It is impossible to predict what might come, but many have a great degree of concern that Hezbollah will try something.
Meanwhile, despite some noise from Hezbollah that it may have removed some of its Radwan special forces from the border region to avoid IDF attacks, the region is on extremely high alert. Two days ago, Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told the American special envoy charged with trying to find a diplomatic solution that there is only “a short window of time to reach a diplomatic” solution. And that “there is only one possible result—a new reality in the northern arena, which will allow for the secure return of our citizens.” Clearly, Gallant is doing his best to add urgency to the discussions and authenticity to his demands. He is also sending a message that Nasrallah should no longer be comforted that Israel’s hand might be stayed so the IDF can focus on its efforts in Gaza or because of President Biden’s request of Israel made in the early days after October 7 not to widen the war.
Gallant’s words are buttressed by the IDF’s actions:
Thousands of IDF reservists have been released from service to jumpstart the economy for the moment but there is understanding that this might only be temporary should conditions change in the north.
In Gaza, the IDF has withdrawn several large units because the nature of the fighting is changing. With the fall of northern Gaza and successes in the south, more and more engagements are of the type that special forces excel in and in which such large ground forces are not required.
The air force is no longer flying nearly as many air missions over Gaza, releasing its power to deal with Hezbollah.
In the north, especially in the large open areas of the Golan heights, the IDF is training for an imminent fight with Hezbollah.
Thus, it appears the IDF is untangling itself in Gaza, giving its fighting forces a respite, and getting ready for what may come in the north.
But given that Hezbollah controls 200 Shiite towns in south Lebanon in which Radwan forces can easily hide and that Hezbollah will not agree voluntarily to withdraw from, and that Israel has no intention of giving up control of the lands that Nasrallah covets and falsely, or at least opportunistically, claims are part of Lebanon, I have little hope that diplomacy will achieve anything. Especially because turning over to Hezbollah’s clutches or resettling against their wishes thousands of former Syrian citizens that live in Ghajar who now are Israeli citizens (at their request), or retreating from the security critical Shebaa Farms that loom over Israel’s northern Galilee towns are both non-starters. Nevertheless, something needs to happen soon to reverse Israel’s loss of sovereignty along the borders. Its citizens demand it, and Israel’s future survival requires it.
Therefore, even as the war in Gaza continues, our gaze should look increasingly to the north where flames are replacing embers and war by intent or miscalculation is becoming increasingly likely.
![View inside a Hezbollah tunnel that crosses from Lebanon to Israel, on the border between Israel and Lebanon in northern Israel, on February 14, 2023. (Yossi Zamir/Flash90) View inside a Hezbollah tunnel that crosses from Lebanon to Israel, on the border between Israel and Lebanon in northern Israel, on February 14, 2023. (Yossi Zamir/Flash90)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bab8f44-fcd1-4c42-be7e-154f89fe25ed_1024x640.jpeg)
Expert: Hezbollah has Built a Vast Tunnel Network Far More Sophisticated than Hamas’s—Written by Tal Schneider for Times of Israel—January 2, 2024
Attackers Laughed as They Raped and Murdered a Woman in Israel on October 7, Witness Says—Written by Jake Tapper, Kirsten Appleton and Rachel Clarke for CNN—January 4, 2024.
Why Is the Gaza War Different?—Written by Jonathan Spyer for the Middle East Forum—December 31, 2023
A Coordinated Media Attack on Israel by the New York Times, Washington Post, and CNN—Written by Lenny Ben-David for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs—December 28, 2023
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Israel-Hamas war: How are Thousands of Olim Helping Out?—Written by Noa Amouyal for the Jerusalem Post—December 9, 2023
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Gaza Horizons: Seeing the IDF Progress Against Hamas From Up Close—Written by Seth J. Frantzman for the Jerusalem Post—January 6, 2024
The Violent Attacks Against UNIFIL Illustrate the Inability to Enforce a Future “Diplomatic Agreement” in Southern Lebanon—Written by Sarit Zehavi and Tal Beeri for the Alma Research and Education Center—January 2, 2024
Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah—A War Without End is now available in eBook and hardback format on Amazon and IngramSpark. This compelling narrative explores Hezbollah’s origins and cancerous growth, traces Israel’s response, and reveals Israel’s present readiness to meet Hezbollah’s challenge.
Cliff Sobin
Important Link—Alma Research and Education Center: Understanding the Security Challenges on Israel’s Northern Border